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Abstract 
The participation of lay persons in the adjudication of legal disputes is generally regarded as a 
necessary and effective constituent for a credible and independent judicial system. This is 
exemplified in the trial by jury in jurisdictions with legal systems following the common law 
tradition, and the participation of lay assessors sitting together with (a) professional judge(s) 
in mixed-court tribunals in jurisdictions with legal systems following the civil law tradition. This 
article offers a comprehensive, legal-historical and comparative analysis of the respective 
modes of adjudication adopted in the People’s Republic of China and its Special Administrative 
Region of Hong Kong, for as far as these make provision for the participation of ordinary 
citizens in the adjudication of criminal legal proceedings. The focus on lay participation in the 
criminal legal proceedings of these two jurisdictions serves as an example of legal transplants 
from other “Western” jurisdictions to the “East” through conquest, colonization, and legal 
reform. The critical analysis and review of these legal transplants as provided for here, not only 
elucidate the unique laws and legal systems of these two jurisdictions operating under the one 
country two systems principle, it also raises questions with regard to the true value and 
suitability of the respective lay participation models with reference to its distinct, contemporary 
Chinese context. The question remains, from medieval “West” to the present-day “East”, 
whether the participation of lay persons in the adjudication of legal (criminal) disputes is not 
overestimated, and whether it is truly a guarantor of (or at least contributing to) a credible and 
independent judicial system. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The participation of ordinary citizens in the various spheres of 
public life serves an important legitimation function as it represents 
the local interest, the voice of the people, the unprivileged classes, and 
ultimately, the ideals of democracy. 1  In terms of national legal 
systems and the adjudication of criminal disputes specifically, the role 
of lay persons is generally recognised as an essential component in the 
state legal machinery. This is true of most states, jurisdictions, and 
other legal entities the world over, and irrespective of the predominant 
political ideology or the specific features of their legal systems, as it 
 
 1 Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate 
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 778 (1995). See generally Richard 
O. Lempert, The Internationalisation of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury 
Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477 (2007). 
  
2019] LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE ADJUDICATION  185 
is generally accepted that people will have greater confidence in a 
system – whatever that system is – if they perceive themselves and 
their peers as having some stake, or input therein.2  
The focus of this article is on lay participation in the criminal legal 
proceedings of the People’s Republic of China and its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. This world region offers a 
particularly interesting locus for reflection on the two dominant modes 
whereby lay participation in criminal legal proceedings is ensured – 
the jury trial3 and the mixed court or tribunal4 – as both these two 
models feature in the courts and legal systems of the People’s Republic 
of China and its Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong. The 
focus on lay participation in the criminal legal proceedings of these 
two jurisdictions is not only interesting in terms of their unique laws 
and legal systems, but also serves as an example of legal transplants 
from various other “Western” jurisdictions to the “East” through 
conquest, colonization and legal reform. By no means does this article 
attempt to compare the Western systems of lay participation in the 
adjudication of criminal disputes with the analogous practice in the 
legal systems of the People’s Republic of China and its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. Indeed, this would be a futile 
endeavor; it has long been settled that one cannot “interpret the 
Chinese system in terms of Western juristic thought and to analyse it 
 
 2 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, An Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ Support for Mixed 
Tribunals, 25 L. & POL’Y 93, 97 (2003); Xin He, Double Whammy: Lay Assessors as Lackeys in Chinese 
Courts, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 733, 733-34 (2016). 
 3 A jury trial is usually presided over by a professional judge who controls and guides the legal 
process and decide on procedure and questions of law, including the sentence in the event of a conviction. 
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, the professional judge is assisted by a number of lay 
persons randomly selected to constitute a jury, and who is tasked with the ultimate decision to return a 
verdict under the guidance and direction of the judge. These jury members may either represent a random 
section of the community or represent persons with a background or social status similar to that of the 
accused. See generally Hermann Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental Criminal Law, 53 L. 
Q. REV. 99 (1937); Colin Davies & Christopher Edwards, ‘A Jury of Peers’: A Comparative Analysis, 68 
J. CRIM. L. 150, 151-152 (2004). 
 4 Mixed courts or tribunals refer to an array of lay participation models which provide for a number 
of lay persons to share the bench with a professional judge or professional judges and to oversee and 
ultimately decide together on criminal legal matters, including the guilt or innocence of the accused as 
well as the appropriate sentence in the event of a conviction. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems 
Around the World, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 275 (2008); Stefan Machura, Fairness, Justice, and 
Legitimacy: Experiences of People’s Judges in South Russia, 25 L. & POL’Y 123, 124 (2003). 
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in terms of comparative law”.5 Nor can one interpret and compare 
medieval legal processes and practices with those of our modern legal 
systems and laws today. However, the tracing of the legal-historical 
development and subsequent geographical transplants of legal systems 
and their institutions for adjudication, including the consistent 
participation of its citizenry, offer valuable insights for further 
analysis. It allows us to see, “with greater clarity than elsewhere, what 
may happen when legal institutions are transferred bodily to foreign 
countries, what errors are likely to arise, and what results can be 
achieved.”6  
Part II of this article provides a historical overview of lay 
participation in the process of adjudicating criminal disputes from its 
early representations in medieval Europe and England, up to the 
nineteenth century when the rudiments of the two dominant legal 
traditions – the civil law tradition and the common law tradition – 
became well established. From here, the discussion and analysis will 
turn to the “East”, where these models of lay participation in the 
process of adjudicating criminal disputes were transplanted through 
conquest, colonization and legal reform. To this end, Part III of the 
article provides a succinct overview of the development of the Chinese 
legal system from its earliest origins to date. It will be noted that the 
Chinese legal system does not conform to, or truly resemble either the 
civil law tradition or the common law tradition, and continues to 
develop as a unique third legal tradition of the world. Part IV of the 
article focuses specifically on lay participation in the adjudication of 
criminal trials in the People’s Republic of China as well as its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. This overview and analysis 
highlight the distinctive features of and obstacles to the legal 
development and reform of the people’s assessor system of the 
People’s Republic of China, as well as the trial by jury of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. The article concludes with a 
critical reflection on the present state of lay participation in the 
criminal legal proceedings of the People’s Republic of China and its 
Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. While it will be 
questioned whether lay participation in the criminal legal proceedings 
 
 5 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND 
EAST ASIA 407 (1994); ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (H.K., LexisNexis 4th ed. 2011). 
 6 Mannheim, supra note 3, at 99. 
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of these two jurisdictions truly contributes to the credibility and 
independence of the respective legal adjudication processes, it will 
also be shown that its ultimate value may lie in its theatrical bid for 
consensus in society; a necessary ceremony in the adjudication of legal 
disputes.  
II. THE HISTORY OF TRIAL BY PEERS I: OF ORDEALS, GOVERNMENTAL 
CONTROL, AND LEGAL TRADITIONS: THE STORY OF THE WEST 
Life in medieval Europe was governed by “a bewildering variety 
of laws and jurisdictions”, including the local laws of towns and 
communes, feudal laws in the countryside, the statutes of guilds and 
corporations that dominated their metiers, canon law and ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, the temporal legal authority of kings and princes, and 
finally, the jus commune – the Roman non-religious law based on 
Justinian’s Corpus juris civilis - studied and taught by scholars in the 
universities. 7  Various methods and procedures also existed to 
adjudicate disputes and to determine truth or facilitate proof. Amongst 
this variety, the primary methods of proof in the Middle Ages were by 
way of ordeal, wager of battle, or compurgation.8 To fully understand 
medieval legal procedure, and specifically the trial by ordeal, trial by 
battle, and compurgation, it is important to remember that the theory 
of law at that time “placed the burden of proof on the negative side”; 
in other words, those who stood accused had to prove their innocence. 
Sometimes, the accusers were even put to the same test themselves 
and had to undergo the same ordeal as the one who stood accused, in 
proof of the veracity of their accusation. 9  In the discussion that 
follows, these early medieval modes of proof will briefly be 
introduced as it is from these medieval modes of proof that the 
contemporary modes of adjudication ultimately developed. It is also 
in the subsequent reform of these early modes of proof that the 
 
 7 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 5, 350. 
 8 Elizabeth Papp Kamali & Thomas A. Green, The Assumptions Underlying England’s Adoption of 
Trial by Jury for Crime, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND IRELAND 51, 52 
(Travis R. Baker ed., 2018); John W. Baldwin, The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 against 
Ordeals, 36 SPECULUM 613 (1961); Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J. L. ECON. 691, 710-11 (2011); 
ARTHUR C. HOWLAND, TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF EUROPEAN 
HISTORY 4, at 2 (1901). 
 9 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 2; ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL 
JUDICIAL ORDEAL 29-30 (N.Y., Clarendon Press of Oxford Univ. Press 1986). This is also true of ancient 
Chinese law, where the petitioner of an accusation could receive the same punishment as the accused if 
the accusation proved to be false, see MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 412. 
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rudiments of the two dominant legal traditions – the common law and 
the civil law tradition – can be traced. This legal-historical overview 
is therefore important for the thesis of this article, as the two dominant 
legal traditions and the modes of adjudication were ultimately 
transplanted through conquest, colonization and legal reform, to the 
People’s Republic of China and its Special Administrative Region of 
Hong Kong. 
A. The Medieval Modes of Proof 
The trial by ordeal (iudicium Dei or judgment of God) essentially 
left the fate of those who stood accused, as well as the fate of the 
accusers, to superstition. It was believed that God, through clergy-
conducted physical tests, would condemn the guilty and exonerate the 
innocent.10 Bloomfield defined the ordeal as follows: 
“Ordeal is a formal test or a test employed under some fixed 
conditions to determine the will of God, the gods, the dead or 
fate, in a matter of some importance, often involving innocence 
or guilt, for human beings. It is most usually associated with 
determining the guilt of a person or truth of a claim in order that 
justice be done, but not always or necessarily.”11 
During the golden age of the iudicium Dei,12 two types of ordeals 
flourished: the hot, and the cold.13 Hot ordeals involved the use of hot 
water (iudicium aquae fervantis) or hot irons (iudicium ferri)14 and 
usually operated on the premise that an innocent accused would 
remain unscathed. For example, the hot-water ordeal required a priest 
to boil a cauldron of water into which he threw a stone or ring and then 
proceeded to request the accused to fish it out. If the arm of the accused 
remained unharmed, he was exonerated and if not, he was convicted.15 
A cold-water ordeal (probation per aquam frigidam) was described by 
 
 10 Leeson, supra note 8, at 692.  
 11 Morton W. Bloomfield, Beowulf, Byrhtnoth, and the Judgment of God: Trial by Combat in Anglo-
Saxon England, 44 SPECULUM 545, 548 (1969). 
 12 iudicium Dei means a period of time from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries. 
 13 Leeson, supra note 8, at 693. See HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 7-18 (discussing various types of 
other ordeals).  
 14 Leeson, supra note 8, at 694 (explaining that the hot iron ordeal required of the accused to carry a 
piece of burning iron nine paces). 
 15 Leeson, supra note 8, at 694. 
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Hincmar of Rheims, a ninth-century theologian, as follows: “‘[H]e 
who is to be examined by this judgment is cast into the water bound, 
and is drawn forth again bound.’ If he is guilty and ‘seeks to hide the 
truth by a lie, [he] cannot be submerged’: he will float…If he is 
innocent, he can be submerged: he will sink.”16 These ordeals were 
mainly reserved for criminal cases in England, and also for select civil 
proceedings in the rest of Europe.17 The trial by ordeal was, however, 
not the mainstay mode of proof, and a thirteenth-century German 
law18 suggests that the trial by ordeal was not ordered in cases where 
there was clear evidence of guilt.19 
Ad lib, the trial by ordeal as a mode for establishing truth may seem 
irrational and most people today would agree that these ordeals did not 
actually do what they were supposedly designed to achieve; to 
determine the guilt or innocence of those who stood accused. Yet, the 
trial by ordeal played a very important role in medieval society at that 
time. Brown explained this as follows: 
“The very course of the ritual of the ordeal helped to contain 
conflict and to bring about a resolution. The ceremony applied a 
discreet massage to the ruffled feelings of the group. The most 
marked feature of the ordeal is the slow and solemn processes 
by which human conflict is taken out of its immediate context. 
The representative of the conflict – the man who undertakes the 
ordeal, who can be accuser or accused – is publicly shorn of all 
contact with the normal world. Shaved, dressed in a shirt, for 
three days his diet and his whole rhythm of life is that of a priest 
not of a layman. He is solemnly blessed, stripped of talismans 
and amulets (the normal adjuncts of purely human conflict); he 
 
 16 Leeson, supra note 8, at 694, quoting HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 11 
 17 Judicial combat, in turn, was generally used to settle property disputes or to decide criminal cases. 
Leeson, supra note 23, at 694, 710. See also BARTLETT, supra note 9; Bloomfield, supra note 11; THE 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE (Wendy Davies & Paul Fouracre eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1986); HUGH GROITEIN, PRIMITIVE ORDEAL AND MODERN LAW (London, 
George Allen & Unwin 1923); HENRY C. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE: ESSAYS ON THE WAGER OF 
LAW, THE WAGER OF BATTLE, THE ORDEAL, TORTURE (Philadelphia: Collins 3rd ed.1878); Finbarr 
McAuley, Canon Law and the End of the Ordeal, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473 (2006); William Ian 
Miller, Ordeal in Iceland, 60 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 189-218 (1988); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1898). 
 18 This law read as follows: “It is not right to use the ordeal in any case, unless the truth may be known 
in no other way.” Leeson, supra note 8, at 695, quoting BARTLETT, supra note 9 at 26. 
 19 Leeson, supra note 8, at 695. See also Roger D. Groot, The Jury of Presentment before 1215, 26 
AMERICAN J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (1982); Frederick Pollock, English Law before the Norman Conquest, 14 
L. Q. REV. 291 (1898). 
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is liberally doused with holy water and transformed by long 
prayers of benediction into a prototype of the ancient righteous 
man delivered in times of tribulation. He is no longer part of a 
human lawsuit. He is the spearhead of justice, but it is a 
spearhead carefully detached by long rituals from its haft, from 
the pressures of the groups ranged behind a disputed issue. The 
ordeal is entered into under conditions where the human group 
has usually reached deadlock. An ordeal is a tacit ‘defusing’ of 
the issue. It is not a judgment by God; it is a remitting of a case 
ad iudicium Dei ‘to the judgment of God.’ This is an action 
tantamount to removing the keystone of the arch on which, 
hitherto, all pressures had converged. Once removed, a decision 
can be reached quickly and without loss of face by either side. 
For being brought to the judgment of God, the case already 
stepped outside the pressures of human interest, and so its 
resolution can be devoid of much of the odium of human 
responsibility.”20  
In addition to this symbolic value of the trial by ordeal during 
medieval times, it has also been suggested to have been quite effective, 
as the unwavering belief in the ordeal as a mode of truth and proof 
ultimately resulted in only innocent defendants being willing to 
undergo this fate.  
“Guilty defendants expected ordeals to convict them. 
Innocent defendants expected the reverse. Thus, only innocent 
defendants were willing to undergo ordeals. Conditional on 
observing a defendant’s willingness to do so, the administering 
priest knew he or she was innocent and manipulated the ordeal 
to find this.”21 
By the twelfth century, however, high-ranking ecclesiastics, at the 
behest of King Henry II who personally stood sceptical to the trial by 
ordeal,22 began seriously questioning the association of these ordeals 
 
 20 Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change, 104 DAEDALUS 133, 137-38 
(1975). See also Bloomfield, supra note 11, at 551. 
 21 Leeson, supra note 8, at 692. See also Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early 
Medieval Law, 4 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 571 (1974); HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 2; Margaret H. 
Kerr, Richard D. Forsyth & Michael J. Plyley, Cold Water and Hot Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England, 22 
J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 573, 580 (1992).  
 22 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 16. 
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with their religion, as the ordeals had no scriptural sanction23 and 
violated an important Christian proscription: “[T]hou shalt not tempt 
the Lord thy God”.24 Judicial ordeals, in essence, “required priests to 
command God to perform miracles at their whim, which the Bible 
forbids”. 25  The Fourth Lateran Council subsequently rejected the 
legitimacy of judicial ordeals in 1215, and banned all priests from 
participating in or administering them.26 The Fourth Lateran Council 
also abolished judicial combat or trial by combat (duellum) in that 
same year, but this mode of proof “survived for centuries the ordeal 
proper”, as duels could easily be fought without the aid of a priest.27 
Judicial combat is of Germanic origin and became a recognised mode 
of proof in England only after the Norman Conquest.28 According to 
Bloomfield, judicial combat was generally regarded as a forward step 
in the development of trial procedures as it gave both parties the 
opportunity to actively participate in the process of determining 
truth.29  
“Trial by combat was undoubtedly a forward step in the 
development of trial procedures as it put under some kind of 
order a method which was no doubt frequently used at random 
– the use of force to settle disputes. The oracle, usually though 
not always, attempted to determine the truth of the future; the 
 
 23 Leeson, supra note 8, at 709. Leeson also noted that the Bible contains but one instance of what 
might be construed as an actual judicial ordeal in the Book of Numbers (Num. 5:11-31) where an accused 
adulteress undergoes an ordeal of bitter waters (poison ingestion) to prove her fidelity. 
 24 Leeson, supra note 8, at 709 (referring to Deuteronomy 6 verse 16 and Matthew 4 verse 7). 
 25 Leeson, supra note 8, at 709. 
 26 The decree read: “Let no ecclesiastic … pronounce over the ordeal of hot or cold water or glowing 
iron any benediction or rite of consecration, regard being also paid to the prohibitions formerly 
promulgated respecting the single combat or duel.” Leeson, supra note 8, at 709, quoting HOWLAND, 
supra note 8, at 16. 
 27 Denmark prohibited the trial by ordeal in 1216, England in 1219, Scotland in 1230, Italy in 1231 
and Flanders between 1208 and 1233. Shortly thereafter, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and others followed 
suit. Leeson notes that France never formally abolished ordeals, but the last known mention made to 
ordeals can be found in 1218. Leeson, supra note 8, at 710. RAOUL-CHARLES VAN CAENEGEM, LEGAL 
HISTORY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 87 (London, Hambledon Press 1991). Judicial combat continued 
until the late thirteenth century in Spain, until the fourteenth century in Italy, Flanders, and Germany, and 
until the fifteenth century in Portugal, France, and Hungary. In England, the last judicial combat is 
believed to have been fought in 1456. And Howland suggests that the trial by battle was only formally 
abolished in 1819. Leeson, supra note 8, at 710-711, quoting THAYER, supra note 17, at 39. See also M.J. 
Russell, Trial by Battle and the Appeals of Felony, 1 J. LEGAL HIST. 135, 154 (1980); Colman, supra note 
21, at 587; HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 18. 
 28 Bloomfield, supra note 11, at 554. 
 29 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 2; Leeson, supra note 8, at 342. 
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ordeal that of the past. It is easy to understand why trial by 
combat persisted as long as it did. It favoured the strong, and it 
could clam divine sanction.”30 
Contrary to the trial by ordeal and trial by combat, an ancient 
device known as purgation by oath or purgatio had the support of 
scriptural sanction.31 Compurgation, oath swearing, or wager of law 
(vadiare legem), refers to the swearing off of an accusation by an 
accused himself, or with the assistance of oath-helpers who swore on 
his behalf. Such oath-helpers or compurgators “were originally 
kinsmen, who would have had to pay the wer-gild in case the accused 
had been convicted of the charge, but later custom permitted them to 
be neighbours or others acceptable to the court. Their number varied 
according to the gravity of the charge and the character of the 
accused.”32 This offer of an oath as evidence had its roots in the 
apostolic statement that “‘an oath for confirmation is to them an end 
of all strife’, and was utilised particularly in cases involving clergy”.33 
In fact, oath swearing just like the trial by ordeal and the trial by battle 
remained a mode of proof based on divine justice as it was premised 
on the principle jurare est testem Deum invocare; those swearing 
understood that God and the saint on whose relics the oath was made 
would be their witnesses, and that they (the oath swearers) would be 
punished for any perjury. 34  Despite this threat of punishment for 
perjury, it is important to remember that oath-helpers were in no sense 
witnesses; it was not expected of them to have first-hand knowledge 
of the matter, nor were they expected to give testimony. Oath-helpers 
merely expressed their confidence in the veracity of their principal’s 
word.35 In tracing the legal-historical significance of this mode of 
proof, Howland explained: “This method of proof dates back to 
remote antiquity among the Germanic tribes, and on their conversion 
it was adopted by the church, which made such extensive use of it in 
 
 30 Bloomfield, supra note 11, at 551-552. 
 31 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 617, referring to The Bible Hebrews 6 verse 16. 
 32 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 3. 
 33 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 617, referring to The Bible Hebrews 6 verse 16. 
 34 Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in ON THE LAWS 
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 92-93 (Morris S Arnold et al. eds., Chapel Hill, Univ. North Carolina Press 
1981). 
 35 LEA, supra note 17, at 58. 
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its efforts to secure immunity of the clergy from secular jurisdiction 
that the process finally became known as canonical compurgation.”36  
The oath was also important to mediaeval Romanists who 
generally ignored the whole problem of ordeals and were largely 
preoccupied with the re-establishment of ancient Roman 
jurisprudence.37 Baldwin explains that to the Romanists, “full and 
clear legal proof consisted mainly of written instruments and 
witnesses”.38 However, the Romanists also recognised that full proof 
was not always possible, due to lack of evidence including eye 
witnesses. Such cases, according to the Romans, had to be dealt with 
as follows:  
“…in criminal cases when the plaintiff was not able to 
establish complete evidence the defendant was immediately 
acquitted, because it was preferable to allow the guilty to escape 
than to punish unjustly the innocent. In civil cases the Romanists 
generally recognised a category of semi-complete proof which 
included certain kinds of evidence, such as presumptions, 
notoriety, or one witness, instead of two, which constituted full 
proof. In the case of certain semi-complete evidence, the judge 
could assign an oath (iusiurandum, iuramentum, sacramentum) 
to one of the parties, and the case would be decided on the basis 
of that oath. Intricate rules were drawn up to determine whether 
the oath should be taken by the plaintiff or the defendant. By the 
time of Azo this judicial oath of the Romanists was called 
purgation and contained marked similarities to the canonical 
purgation of the ecclesiastical courts.”39 
As with the trial by ordeal and trail by battle, compurgation also 
involved elaborate ceremonies with notable weight and attention given 
to procedure. 40  In fact, exact compliance with the prescribed 
procedure and its many rigid and precise rules was a prerequisite for 
success in the process of oath-making: “[T]here were detailed 
provisions on determining the number of oath-helpers that had to be 
 
 36 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 3. 
 37 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 615-161. 
 38 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 616. 
 39 Baldwin, supra note 8, at 616. 
 40 H.L. Ho, The legitimacy of medieval proof, 19 J. L. & RELIGION 259, 266 (2003-2004). 
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called, and of calculating the value of an oath according to the social 
class to which its maker belonged. The conduct of the trial has been 
described as ‘rigorously formalistic’; there was punctilious regard for 
formalities’ and a ‘rigid adherence to forms’. ‘Things had to be done 
in the right way and the right things had to be said, using the correct 
words’.”41  
An important shortcoming for both the ecclesiastical use of 
purgation as well as the Roman use of oaths, was the control exerted 
by the various pledge groups, kinship ties, and local folk assemblies 
of the early medieval societies.42 Coleman explained as follows: 
“The majority of civil and criminal cases were settled by 
oath-swearing, the number of oath-helpers depending on the 
circumstances, and since every free man was enrolled in a 
pledge group responsible for his welfare, the unfree depending 
on their lords, denial of support was tantamount to an adverse 
verdict. How else can we explain a defendant’s failure to secure 
oath-helpers in a society where we know everyone had sureties? 
The oath, which was ‘the primary mode of proof’, went ‘not to 
the truth of a specific fact but to the justice of the claim or 
defence as a whole’, and there is no a priori reason to suppose 
that the community acted blindly on such occasions, nor to 
attribute to our forebears a token of exercise of discretion simply 
because the court records indicate ‘small 
scope…for…reasonable adjudication on the facts’.”43  
The oaths of unfree persons, who composed much of the medieval 
population, were furthermore not accepted and so too were the oaths 
of foreigners, those who had perjured themselves, had failed in a legal 
contest, or had otherwise tarnished reputations, been branded as 
unacceptable.44 It was also noted that the elaborate ceremonies and 
rigid and precise rules of compurgation rendered it a mere technical 
 
 41 Ho, supra note 40, at 267, quoting MAX RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEVER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 227 (Boston, Harvard Univ. Press 1954); THAYER, supra note 17, at 8; Wendy Davies, Local 
Participation and Legal Ritual in Early Medieval Law Courts in THE MORAL WORLD OF THE LAW 48 
(Peter Cross ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); LEA, supra note 17, at 40. 
 42 Colman, supra note 21, at 575. See generally Ho, supra note 40, at 259-298. 
 43 Colman, supra note 21, at 576. 
 44 Leeson, supra note 8, at 695. 
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ceremony.45 By the thirteenth century, therefore, compurgation had 
come to be looked upon with suspicion by the royal judges and the 
Church alike.46 
Subsequent legal reform with regard to modes of proof and 
adjudication, did not immediately abandon the practice of negative 
proof; on the Continent, it brought in the worst form of that system, 
reliance on confession as proof and torture as the means to obtain it.47 
And in England, the void was filled by the jury verdict as proof. 
Curiously, however, the English jury trial was not conceived by an 
Englishman, nor was it instigated by the people and for the people.48 
B. From Medieval Modes of Proof to Contemporary Modes of 
Adjudication: The Common Law Tradition 
The origin of the English criminal jury is conventionally dated 
1166 with King Henry II, ordaining by way of the Assize of 
Clarendon, the selection and swearing in of “twelve lawful men of 
each hundred; four such men were also to be selected from each vill.49 
These jurors were to report, first to the sheriff’s court and then to the 
royal justices on eyre, anyone within their respective jurisdictions who 
was accused of or reputed to have committed certain serious crimes. 
Such a person was then to undergo the ordeal.”50 At first therefore, 
and at least until 1215, some kind of dual mode of proof continued for 
a period after the Assize of Clarendon was ordained.51 On the one 
hand were the compurgators and on the other the juratores summoned 
by a public officer at the behest of King Henry II.52 Pollock describes 
this difference between the compurgators and the juratores as follows: 
 
 45 LEA, supra note 17, at 56. 
 46 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 6. 
 47 HOWLAND, supra note 8, at 2; Groot, supra note 19, at 1. 
 48 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE 
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 2, at 142 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1911). 
 49 The hundred was a political subdivision of the shire or country and the vill was a yet smaller unit 
which Pollock describes as a township. Groot, supra note 19, at 3. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 
48, at 137, 145 and 529.  
 50 Groot, supra note 19, at 3. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 152. 
 51 Groot, supra note 19, at 3-4; Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 21, at 574. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 48, at 142. 
 52 While a clear distinction exists, therefore, between the compurgators and the juratores, it is 
generally also accepted that there may have been some historical linkages. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 48, at 139-140; LEA, supra note 17, at 32 and 45. 
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“…we have to distinguish the jury from a body of 
doomsmen,53 and also from a body of compurgators or other 
witnesses adduced by a litigant to prove his case. …the 
witnesses of the old Germanic folk-law differ in two respects 
from our jurors or recognitors: - they are summoned by one of 
the litigants, and they are summoned to swear to a set formula. 
The jurors are summoned by a public officer and take an oath 
which binds them to tell the truth, whatever the truth may be. In 
particular, they differ from oath-helpers or compurgators. The 
oath-helper is brought in that he may swear to the truth of his 
principal’s oath. Normally he has been chosen by the litigant 
whose oath he is to support, and even when, as sometimes 
happens, the law, attempting to make the old procedure 
somewhat more rational, compels a man to choose his oath-
helpers from among a group of persons designated by his 
adversary or by his judges, still the chosen oath-helper has 
merely the choice between swearing to a set formula…or 
refusing to swear at all. On the other hand, the recognitor must 
swear a promissory oath; he swears that he will speak the truth 
whatever the truth may be.”54 
It is well established that the juratores appointed under the Assize 
had a duty to report every crime and every suspect and that they also 
transmitted rumours and community suspicions.55 The value of this 
mode of proof to the King was manifold: 
“He uses it in his litigation: - he will rely on the verdict of 
the neighbours instead of on battle or the ordeal. He uses it in 
order that he may learn how he is served by his subordinates: - 
the neighbours are required to say all that they know about the 
misconduct of the royal officers. He uses it in order that he may 
detect those grave crimes which threaten his peace: - the 
 
 53 According to Pollock, doomsmen were representatives from the vill, a smaller unit or township, 
who were summoned by the sheriff on a regular basis every year to hear minor offences. Pollock 
explained that “[p]resentments respecting crimes and minor offences are disposed of on the spot; 
presentments of crimes merely serve to initiate proceedings against the accused who will be tried by the 
king’s justices.” See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 29-530. 
 54 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 139-140. Groot, supra note 19, at 3-4. 
 55 Groot, supra note 19, at 5. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 138. 
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neighbours must say whether they suspect any of murders or 
robberies [etc.].”56 
And at first, these juratores were only tasked with providing vere 
dicta (true statements). Glaeser and Shleifer explain: 
“In its original formulation (dated roughly to the various 
royal assesses in the 1150s and 1160s), the jury was an 
assembled body of local notables who would inform itinerant 
royal judges of local facts.… In its initial incarnation, the jury 
was responsible for providing vere dicta (true statements) and 
not actually given control over the outcome of the case. While 
the public nature of the juries’ verdicts surely made it difficult 
for judges to completely ignore them, initially juries were an 
efficient means of gathering information, and not a check on the 
royal prerogative.”57 
This was the origin of the English jury; established in and 
developed from the “Frankish inquisitio, the prerogative rights of the 
Frankish kings. …the Frankish king has in some measure placed 
himself outside the formalism of the old folk-law; his court can 
administer an equity which tempers the rigour of the law and makes 
short cuts to the truth.”58 While some evidence exists of a similar 
inquest procedure in France and Germany at that time, that inquest 
procedure was soon overwhelmed by the spread of the Romano-
Canonical procedure, or inquisitorial procedure which is detailed in 
the subsequent Part C below.59 
Pollock explained that the old modes of proof, though abolished, 
did not disappear completely in English law and practice, and that 
proof by battle survived until 1819 and proof by oath-helpers until 
1833.60 However, under the reign of King Henry II, the exceptional 
inquest procedure soon became the norm and developed to the extent 
 
 56 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 141. 
 57 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193, 1198 (2002). Of the 
jury’s original duty to only speak the truth Pollock states as follows: “Even though the form of the verdict 
and its conclusive force be such that the judgment must follow as mere matter of course, still between the 
sworn verdict and the judgment there is a deep gulf.” POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 139. 
 58 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 140-141, 143. 
 59 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 141. 
 60 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 150. 
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that the juratores were no longer limited to only reporting the truth, or 
casting suspicion, but they were also required to draw the usual 
inference from the facts presented so as to make a judgment or cast a 
verdict.61 This increased influence of the juratores can in part be 
attributed to the rapidly accelerated judicial business being transacted 
in the King’s name, as criminal justice became an important source of 
revenue for the King.62 Eventually the juratores was “no longer an 
extraordinary tribunal, a court for great men, for great cases, for 
matters that concerned the king; it was to become an ordinary tribunal 
for the whole realm”.63 In criminal proceedings, the juratores’ own 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused and the fact that the accusation 
was made were textually clearly distinguished in case law.64 Groot 
explains that this textual distinction is evidence that “the jurors were 
adjudicating – first accusing and then opining about the accuracy of 
the accusation”. 65  And with the juratores having enjoyed some 
immunity from liability for falsely accusing, they also had “a 
significant power to adjudicate – to say that a defendant, although the 
object of suspicion, was ‘not guilty’”.66 The clear textual distinction 
between the information laid and the opinion or verdict of the 
juratores can, however, also be attributed to the fact that the King 
continued to exert strict control over the administration of justice; 
“[s]hort of proclaiming his own will to be the judgment of his court, 
there was little that he could not or would not do by way of controlling 
all the justice that was done in his name. …Even when he had 
appointed judges to hear a cause, they would advise the successful 
litigant to wait until a judgment could be given by the king’s own 
mouth.”67 
A complete exposition of the history of English law after the death 
of King Henry II in 1189 does not fall within the ambit of the 
discussion here.68 Suffice it to note that the system of adjudication 
 
 61 Groot, supra note 19, at 10; Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1198. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 48, at 151-153. 
 62 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1199; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, at 150-153. 
 63 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48, 153. 
 64 Groot, supra note 19, at 11. 
 65 Groot, supra note 19, at 13. 
 66 Groot, supra note 19, at 21. 
 67 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48 at 158-159. 
 68 See generally Kamali & Green, supra note 8 at 51-81. 
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which King Henry II established in England became so strong and 
influential, that the Charter of Liberties or Magna Carta issued in 1215 
by King John of England as a practical solution to the political crisis 
that he faced, included a critical statement of veto power for lay 
persons in the administration of justice: 
“No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
outlawed or exiled or in any wise destroyed, save by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” 69 
The Magna Carta established for the first time that everyone, 
including the King was subject to the law, and that all “free men” had 
the right to justice and a fair trial which, for all intents and purposes, 
included a trial by jury.  
C. From Medieval Modes of Proof to Contemporary Modes of 
Adjudication: The Civil Law Tradition 
The comparable development in Continental Europe was wholly 
different. France, for example, moved toward a judge-inquisitor model 
governed by Romano-Canon law. While the role of the judge in the 
developing English jury system of that time was limited to maintaining 
courtroom order, framing questions that the juries must answer, and 
ensuring compliance with the ground rules of the various forms of 
action, 70 the judges in the French system questioned witnesses 
privately and separately, prepared written records, and themselves 
determined the outcome of the case: “These judges were directly 
beholden to the king, and there is no question that the king had the 
ability to strongly influence their actions through appointments, 
reappointments, and bribes.” 71  To explain this divergence in the 
French and English design of adjudication, regard must be had to the 
social history of France. 72  The political dynamism in France was 
threefold at that time, and consisted of the King, the magnates (e.g. 
bankers, traders and opulent watchmakers) and local notables (a small 
 
 69 Magna Carta 1215, cl. 39. Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1199; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 48, at 155-157 
 70 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1199, quoting JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 
136 (New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2007) (1960).  
 71 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1200 
 72 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1194.  
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elite group of individuals and family lineages endowed with economic 
wealth, social prestige, and political power). 73  While the King’s 
access to the populace for taxation was mediated through the nobles, 
the local magnates retained significant power in their regions, and 
remained impenetrable by the royal centre.74 A jury of notables in 
France, “would therefore not have been able to deliver justice when 
the interests of the local magnates were involved… [and]…it was 
more efficient to surrender adjudicatory powers to royal judges, even 
when the preferences of the king did not reflect community justice”.75 
In England, in contrast, “local magnates were weaker relative to the 
knights...[and]…local pressure on the juries was [therefore] weaker, 
and the decisions they could reach were probably closer to the 
community standards of justice”.76 
The differences in the legal traditions that so developed in England 
and France, were further perpetuated in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries when the Romanist tradition of codified law77 - which has 
its origin in 450 BC, the supposed publication date of the XII Tables 
of Rome - reached its apex.78 With the rise of the nation State, and the 
growth of the concept of national sovereignty, Kings and Rulers 
following the French legal tradition at that time, in an effort to exert 
even more control over judges, the adjudication process, and 
ultimately also justice, actively pursued the codification of law and the 
adoption of codes, of which the French Code Napoléon of 1804, is the 
archetype.79 Glaeser and Shleifer observed that codification “aims to 
provide adjudicators with clear bright line rules, as opposed to broad 
legal principles or standards, for making decisions”.80 They explained 
that no legal system is made up entirely of bright line rules, “but civil 
codes are basically collections of rules intended to restrict the actions 
of the participants in legal systems. We maintain that the purpose of 
 
 73 GRAEME GILL, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 85 (London, Palgrave & 
Macmillan 2nd ed. 2016). 
 74 Gill, supra note 73, at 85; Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1200-1201. 
 75 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1201. 
 76 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1201. 
 77 Written rules as opposed to an oral legal tradition are based on standards and precedent. 
 78 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-6; Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1211-1212. 
 79 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 216, 350, 1093. One of the purposes of the French Revolution 
was indeed for the multiplicity of laws to be abolished, and for the all law-making power and all 
jurisdiction to lodge in the state.  
 80 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1211. 
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such rules to enable sovereigns – whether kings or parliaments – to 
control judges; they are a natural consequence of the reliance on state-
controlled judiciaries.” 81  Thus, while jurisdictions following the 
common law tradition of England also have codes of law and statutes, 
the common law judge retains to a certain extent the flexibility to 
interpret, to disregard the provisions when they conflict with the basic 
principles of the law, and to acknowledge the differences between the 
case under review and the specific provisions of the code or statute. 
Judges in jurisdictions of the civil law tradition, on the other hand, are 
restrained by codes in that they should not “interpret the codes very 
much, and in principle must seek not to differentiate a specific 
situation, but to fit it into the existing provisions of the code”, in 
conformance to a rigid principle of the separation of powers.82 This 
trend of codification in the civil law tradition in turn reinforced the 
inquisitorial nature of the continental systems, which stands in stark 
contrast to the more accusatorial English-based systems.83 The reason 
for this development is because written evidence and reliance on codes 
would have been particularly difficult to institute and sustain in a jury-
type system, plagued with high rates of illiteracy among the general 
population and therefore also its jury members. Kings, on the other 
hand, wanting to control their judges, needed written records of their 
doings and therefore preferred to appoint literate clerics as 
adjudicators.84 In jurisdictions following the common law tradition 
evidence was for this reason collected and presented to juries in a 
public trial while trials in jurisdictions following the civil law tradition 
played a secondary role, also because a public display of evidence 
would have made it harder for the sovereign to review and control 
judicial decisions.85 
Today, most modern national legal systems in the world are either 
predominantly influenced by the English common law tradition, or the 
French civil law tradition due to the transplantation of these two legal 
traditions through conquest and colonisation.86 Glaeser and Shleifer 
explained: 
 
 81 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1211-1212. 
 82 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1211-1212. 
 83 Groot, supra note 19, at 1. 
 84 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1218. 
 85 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1218. 
 86 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-9. 
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“The common law tradition originates in the laws of 
England, and has been transplanted through conquest and 
colonisation to England’s colonies, including the United States, 
Australia, Canada, and many countries in Africa and Asia. The 
civil law tradition has its roots in the Roman law, was lost during 
Dark Ages, but rediscovered by the Catholic Church in the 
eleventh century and adopted by several continental states, 
including France. Napoleon exported French civil law to much 
of Europe, including Spain, by conquest. French civil law was 
later transplanted through conquest and colonisation to Latin 
American and parts of Africa and Asia. 
Structurally, the two systems operate in very different ways: 
civil law relies on professional judges, legal codes, and written 
records, while common law on lay judges, broader legal 
principles, and oral arguments.”87 
Approximately forty-two jurisdictions in the world identify with 
the English common law tradition and forty countries identify with the 
civil law tradition. In addition, German civil law, Scandinavian law 
and socialist law prevail in parts of the world.88 These are mentioned 
separately here because their legal development is distinct; mirroring 
the basic tenets and foundation of the French civil law tradition, but 
also having retained or acquired unique features which set them 
apart.89  
This article will not provide a comprehensive exposition on the 
distinguishing features of, and major differences between the civil law 
and common law traditions,90 nor will it elaborate on the possible 
 
 87 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1193.  
 88 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, with reference to Simeon Djanov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi 
Project (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8890, 2002).  
 89 For an overview of the two predominant legal traditions as well as the various national legal 
systems, see MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5. 
 90 Glaeser & Shleifer summarised the following procedural differences between civil and common 
law systems: “The common law system greatly relies on oral argument and evidence, while in civil law 
systems, much of the evidence is recorded in writing. Trials play a much larger role in a common law 
than in a civil law system. Civil law systems rely on regular and comprehensive superior review of both 
facts and law in a case; in common law systems, in contrast, the appeal is much less frequent, and is 
generally restricted to law rather than facts. Common law systems at least in the last century, have 
generally relied on heavily incentivised state prosecutors, who are separate from judges, especially in the 
criminal cases. In civil law systems, in contrast, judging and prosecution are generally combined in the 
person of the same judge. Finally, although this distinction is less clear-cut, common law systems 
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reasons why different choices were made by the various world 
jurisdictions with regard to their legal system design. This article will 
also not explore notions that these differences in legal traditions which 
ultimately underpin the various legal systems of the world, contribute 
to countries’ political, economic, and social status and conditions, 
including its level of development, efficiency of governments, security 
of property rights, and the prevalence of corruption, to name a few.91 
The focus in this article rather remains on a central choice in the design 
of a legal system, and that is its mode of adjudication, specifically, 
criminal adjudication.  
III. THE HISTORY OF TRIAL BY PEERS II: OF HARMONY, 
GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL, AND LEGAL REFORM AND 
TRANSPLANTATIONS: THE STORY OF THE EAST 
In the preceding part, the origins of modes of proof and 
adjudication were considered from medieval times to its early modern 
manifestation and development in the two dominant legal traditions: 
the common law tradition and the civil law tradition. The subsequent 
transplantation of these two law traditions through conquest and 
colonization to the rest of the world were also noted. In fact, most 
countries have not selected or developed their legal systems on their 
own, but have rather inherited them, at least to a large extent, through 
transplantation.92 But what about the Chinese legal tradition? 
The Chinese legal tradition is “the longest of any enduring political 
system in the world, [and it] rivals that of Roman law in [both] its 
historical importance and lasting influence”. 93  As far as historical 
records reveal, a similar belief in divine justice as evidenced in the 
discussion above on medieval law, has never been a part of the history 
and heritage of the People’s Republic of China. 94  Henry C. Lea 
explained as follows: 
 
generally rely to a greater extent on the precedents from previous judicial decisions than do the civil law 
systems.” See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1217-1218.  
 91 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1194. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of 
Government, 15 J. OF L., ECON. 222 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 
J. OF FIN. 265 (2002); Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON, 1 (2002).  
 92 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 57, at 1221. 
 93 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 405. See also CHEN, supra note 5, at 9. 
 94 LEA, supra note 17, at 219. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. 
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“…we find in the religious history of almost all races, that a 
belief in a Divine Being is accompanied with the expectation 
that special manifestations of power will be made on all 
occasions, and that the interposition of Providence may be had 
for the asking, whenever man, in the pride of his littleness, 
condescends to waive his own judgment, and undertakes to test 
the inscrutable ways of his Creator by the touchstone of his own 
limited reason. Thus miracles come to be expected as matters of 
every-day occurrence, and the laws of nature are to be suspended 
whenever man chooses to tempt his God with the promise of 
right and the threat of injustice to be committed in His Name. 
[…] The superstition which we here find dignified with the 
forms of Christian faith manifests itself among so many races 
and under such diverse stages of civilisation that it may be 
regarded as an inevitable incident in human evolution, only to 
be outgrown at the latest periods of development. In this, 
however, as in so many other particulars, China furnishes 
virtually an exception.”95 
Without any claim to deistic sources or divine intervention, the 
Chinese legal tradition has always been secular, with a high regard for 
rationality, and premised on the norms of various ethical or social 
philosophies, “especially those influenced by China’s familial 
orientations and Confucianist beliefs”.96 Historical sources dating to 
the Xia Dynasty (夏) (circa 2100 – 1600 BC) furthermore reveal a rich 
history of detailed and elaborate codes, which include statutes, 
administrative regulations and procedural prescriptions and penal 
guidelines.97 In fact, the idea of law that developed in China has in 
this sense, much in common with the prevailing features of 
contemporary administrative states in the civil law tradition. Law in 
the imperial Chinese system was an instrument of state regulatory 
control and initially only covered those matters necessary to protect or 
promote state interests, and focused to a large extent on the signalling 
of state punishment.98 It therefore lacked, initially at least, any notion 
of a private ordering by law, and only included rules relating to 
 
 95 LEA, supra note 17, at 218-219. 
 96 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406.  
 97 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 405-406. 
 98 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 405-406. 
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property, contracts, commercial transactions, and familial relations for 
as far as it served state interests.99 Instead, it had “[a]n ideological 
emphasis on social harmony, ordered relationships, and observance of 
ritual based primarily on Confucian thought, [and which] was 
antithetical to the development of [a] private legal ordering. Proper 
behaviour and social order were to be maintained more by education 
and example than by legal rules. All individuals were to act 
benevolently to inferiors and deferentially to superiors so as not to 
disturb the natural order. It was therefore considered better to suffer 
social wrongs than to seek redress for them, even if they could be 
punished by law. Conflict was to be avoided. Dispute resolution was 
not a question of which parties had the ‘law’ on their side; what was 
important was to suppress conflict by making the adversaries 
understand how to behave according to the higher order of Confucian 
morality.”100 The law therefore remained a secondary instrument of 
social control, especially with regard to the regulation of the “private”, 
and a “moral” rather than a “legal” order was preferred for inducing 
correct behaviour.101  
Given the absence of a comprehensive corpus of legal principles, 
rules and categories designed to govern private affairs, popular beliefs 
sometimes found expression in irregular judicial proceedings as a 
method to adjudicate private (those in which the state had no interest) 
disputes.102 Henry C. Lea recorded two such examples in his 1878 
monograph in which he considered some of the superstitions in the 
history of Chinese jurisprudence:103  
“In the popular mind, therefore, the divine interposition may 
perpetually be expected to vindicate innocence and to punish 
crime, and moral teaching to a great extent consists of histories 
illustrating this belief in all its phases and in every possible 
contingency of common-place life. Thus it is related that in A.D. 
1626 the learning Doctor Wang-I had two servants, one stupid 
and the other cunning. The latter stole from his master a sum of 
 
 99 “Unless a matter was of state concern and therefore subject to official regulation, no law existed.” 
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. 
 100 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. LEA, supra note 17, at 219. Di Jiang, Judicial Reform in 
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 101 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406-407. 
 102 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. 
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money, and caused the blame to fall upon his comrade, who was 
unable to justify himself. By way of securing him, he was tied 
to a flagstaff, and his accuser was set to watch him through the 
night. At midnight the flagstaff broke in twain with a loud noise, 
the upper portion falling upon the guilty man and killing him, 
while the innocent was left unhurt; and next morning, when the 
effects of the dead man were examined, the stolen money was 
found among them, thus completely establishing the innocence 
of his intended victim. […] 
“If an injured husband surprises his wife flagrante delicto he 
is at liberty to slay the adulterous pair on the spot; but he must 
then cut off their heads and carry them to the nearest magistrate, 
before whom it is incumbent on him to prove his innocence and 
demonstrate the truth of his story. As external evidence is not 
often to be had in such cases, the usual mode of trial is to place 
the heads in a large tub of water, which is violently stirred. The 
heads, in revolving naturally come together in the centre, when, 
if they meet back to back, the victims are pronounced guiltless, 
and the husband is punished as a murdered; but if they meet face 
to face, the truth of his statement is accepted as demonstrated, 
he is gently bastinadoed to teach him that wives should be more 
closely watched, and is presented a small sum of money whether 
to purchase another spouse.”104 
These “curious form[s] of ordeal by chance”105 are examples of 
the extra-legal remedies and sanctions that were practiced in 
communities by guilds and families for the adjudication of private 
disputes.106 
In contrast to the absence of law for private disputes, the modes of 
proof and adjudication for other legal disputes, those in which the state 
had an interest, were extensively and wholly prescribed in law and 
placed a “heavy emphasis on confession, coerced if necessary”.107 To 
this end, the laws also provided for a set of complex rules for the 
degrees of torture permitted for the extraction of confessions, from 
 
 104 LEA, supra note 17, at 220-221. 
 105 LEA, supra note 17, 220. 
 106 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406, 414. 
 107 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. 
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both witnesses and the accused. 108  Such proceedings were 
inquisitorial in nature and were usually presided over by a government 
official holding judicial and administrative functions.109 No provision 
was made for public participation in the judicial system and its 
adjudicating processes.110 The whole of the criminal legal proceeding 
was furthermore aimed at securing a confession from the accused. 
Once a confession was secured, it was written by a clerk of the court 
and the confessor was forced to affix his or her signature. “This 
signature meant the end of the trial in court. The application of law to 
the fact proved by the confession was an internal matter of the 
officialdom, not the subject of debate in court. …[T]here was no 
judgment in the genuine sense of the word, that is; there was no 
concept of a conclusion which, being reached through fixed rules or 
procedure, was to be regarded as the best substitute for the absolute 
truth and justice of God.”111 The development of the Chinese law in 
this regard, therefore remained concentrated “on the substantive 
specifications of preferred behaviour in particular circumstances, on 
the proper punishments for misbehaviour, and on the realities of 
particular cases”. 112  No institutional distinction comparable to the 
Western categories of civil and criminal cases, law, or procedure, was 
ever made, and the focus remained throughout on the preservation and 
restoration of harmony as it transpired in specific cases, and within 
society. 113  The character 法 (fa), which is usually translated as 
meaning “law”, reflects this as it “conveys primarily a signification of 
‘model’ or ‘method’. Its connotations are primarily persuasive and 
exemplary rather than imperative. Even when it is used to convey 
specifically an imperative signification, that signification does not 
project the idea of universal, compulsive, rigid rules of general 
behaviour external to the parties, but only the idea of the immediate 
command of a present superior in a hierarchical social context.”114 
 
 108 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 406. 
 109 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 413. 
 110 Jiang, supra note 100, at 571-572. 
 111 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 412. 
 112 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 410. 
 113 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 409-410, 412; CHEN, supra note 5, at 18. 
 114 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 409-410. 
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Throughout the centuries and despite the rise and fall of many 
dynasties, this focus on the realities of particular cases, on the 
preservation and restoration of harmony, and of the central role and 
temporal endurance of hierarchical authority, have remained 
hallmarks of the Chinese legal and judicial system.115 To date, the 
law, 法 (fa), essentially remains nothing more than the regulations 
issued by the sovereign and delegated through the branches of a 
bureaucracy of sovereign appointed officials to maintain social 
harmony and control. 116 While the Chinese people may enjoy the 
effects of 法 (fa), no person or organ of state, or other legal subject 
derives any authority from the law.117 In fact, it has been said that 
“[t]he notable lack of magical factors, such as ordeal, in the courts of 
imperial China, and lack of strict formalistic rules of procedure as 
well, can also be explained by the fact that the judge was not a servant 
of a mechanism aimed at objective truth beyond personal wisdom but 
was a representative of an almighty and merciful government which 
held the mandate of heaven to realise harmony in this world. …there 
is therefore little to be said on the subject of judicial organisation other 
than to describe the hierarchical bureaucracy itself.”118 Ultimately, 
the Chinese legal and judicial system simply does not yield to a 
systems theory approach like the legal systems of the West.119  
A complete and comprehensive legal-historical overview of the 
development of the Chinese legal system to date is beyond the scope 
of this article. The focus here remains on a central choice in the design 
of a legal system, and that is its mode of adjudication, specifically, 
criminal adjudication. In this regard, it can be noted that efforts to 
reform and modernise Chinese law commenced in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, towards the end of the Qing Dynasty (清) (1644-
1911).120  In 1904, a Law Reform Bureau was set up to translate 
foreign codes of law and to draft new laws for China. This gave rise 
 
 115 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 411. 
 116 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 410-411; CHEN, supra note 5, at 14. 
 117 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 410-411. 
 118 MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 412-413.  
 119 In fact, the ruling ideology of Marxism-Leninism adopted by the People’s Republic of China after 
1949 is itself ambiguous about the value of legal construction. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 410-
411. CHEN, supra note 5, at 2; Stephen Landsman & Jing Zhang, A Tale of Two Juries: Lay Participation 
Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 179, 197 (2008).  
 120 CHEN, supra note 5, at 28. 
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to a number of new codes being drafted. A leading figure in these law 
reform activities was Shen Jiaben; “[h]e studied the laws of the 
Western nations, including the newly modernised Japanese law, and 
he was dedicated to the improvement of China’s traditional legal 
system.”121 These reform efforts were thwarted, however, with the 
fall of the Qing Dynasty (清) in 1911 and the subsequent period of 
internal strife and wars. 122  In the period 1928-1935 under the 
government of the Republic of China, a series of comprehensive codes 
were promulgated. These were partly based on the European 
continental model (such as the laws of Germany, Japan and 
Switzerland), and partly based on the Anglo-American model, and 
also to some extent on the existing traditions of the law Qing and 
warlord periods.123 These laws, however, were formally abolished 
when the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and 
undertook the construction of a new legal system for China.124 After 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, legal reform and 
development was again stifled, this time by the Anti-Rightest 
Campaign which saw the abolishment of the Chinese Ministry of 
Justice and the organs of judicial administration in 1959, and the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong commencing in 1966 
which saw the further demise of the Chinese legal system.125 After 
the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the Fifth National 
People’s Congress enacted a new Constitution at its meeting in 
February 1978, and the reform and develop of a new socialist legal 
system was initiated.126 Albert Chen describes the progress made to 
date as follows: 
“Since 1979, much has been done in China to rebuild a legal 
system. Many new laws and regulations have been enacted. By 
the end of 2010 – when the task of the creation of ‘a socialist 
legal system with Chinese characteristics’ was proclaimed to 
 
 121 CHEN, supra note 5, at 28. 
 122 E.g., the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-1937), the War of Resistance Against Japan 
(1937-1945), and the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1945-1949). See CHEN, supra note 5, at 30. 
Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 197. 
 123 These laws were collectively known as the Collection of the Six Laws and still form the basis of 
the legal system in Taiwan. See CHEN, supra note 5, at 29; Jiang, supra note 100, at 572. 
 124 CHEN, supra note 5, at 31. 
 125 CHEN, supra note 5, at 36-40. 
 126 CHEN, supra note 5, at 41. 
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have been completed – there existed 236 laws made by the 
National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, more 
than 690 pieces of administrative regulations enacted by the 
State Council, and more than 8,600 pieces of local regulations. 
A new Constitution, the fourth one of the PRC, was promulgated 
in 1982, affirming the idea of legality and related concepts and 
principles. In the new constitution of the CPC127 adopted in 
1982, it is also expressly provided that the Party must operate 
within the scope of the state constitution and state law. Progress 
has also been made in legal institution building. For example, 
legal education has been revived and lawyers have once again 
begun to practice. By 2008, there were 140,000 lawyers in 
mainland China.”128 
IV. LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ITS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF 
HONG KONG 
In this part, the focus is on lay participation in the criminal legal 
proceedings of the People’s Republic of China and its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. The Chinese legal system is 
largely based upon the German legal system (in the civil law tradition), 
and the law provides for a collegial panel (合议庭) of lay assessors 
serving together with professional judges to adjudicate legal 
disputes.129 The Hong Kong legal system, in contrast, is based on the 
British legal system with a conventional trial by jury, as the territory 
known as Hong Kong was acquired by the British Empire as a product 
of the first Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42), also known as the “Opium 
War”.130 The focus on lay participation in criminal legal proceedings 
in these two jurisdictions is not only interesting in terms of their 
unique laws and legal systems, but also serve as examples of legal 
transplants from various other “Western” jurisdictions in the “East” 
through conquest, colonization and legal reform.  
A. The Role of “People’s Assessors” in the Courts of the People’s 
 
 127 CCP represents the Communist Party of China. 
 128 CHEN, supra note 5, at 45. See also Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 202-203. 
 129 Jiang, supra note 100, at 570. 
 130 STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 3 (London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 2004).  
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Republic of China 
Unparalleled in its previous constitutions, article 123 of the fourth 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982) now vests the 
adjudicative power of the State exclusively in the People’s Courts, and 
ensures the independent exercise of adjudicative power in accordance 
with the law and without the interference of administrative organs, 
social organisations, and individuals.131 The Chinese judiciary has, 
since the promulgation of the fourth Constitution in 1982, been 
transformed and continues to develop in terms of its commitment to 
justice (both substantive and procedural), fairness, conscience, 
openness, professionalism, and judicial independence. The latter is 
only tempered by the Party leadership, and the Western practice of 
judicial supremacy is therefore not imitated in the People’s Republic 
of China.132 The Judges Law of the PRC of 1995 is described by 
Albert Chen as “a major step taken towards the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of the Chinese judiciary”, and was the first law in 
the history of the People’s Republic of China to provide for a judiciary 
in a comprehensive and systematic manner.133 Up to the promulgation 
of the Judges Law of the PRC in 1995, the expression “judge” (法官, 
faguan) was not officially used or defined in legislation. Article 2 of 
the Judges Law of the PRC of 1995 now defines judges as follows: 
“Judges are judicial persons who exercise the judicial authority of the 
State according to law, and they include the presidents, vice-
presidents, members of judicial committees, chief judges and associate 
chief judges of divisions, judges and assistant judges of the Supreme 
 
 131 Xian Fa (宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 4, 1982) (2018), art. 123, 126 (Chinalawinfo); Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (人民法院组织法) 
[Organic Law of the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 5, 
1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) (2018) art. 4 (Chianlawinfo). CHEN, supra note 5, at 174. 
 132 With regard to judicial independence, or the lack thereof, see article 10 of the Organic Law of the 
People’s Courts which provides, for example, for the establishment of a judicial committee to each court, 
comprised of the president of the relevant court and some adjudicators appointed on the recommendation 
of the president by the Standing Committee of the relevant People’s Congress. “[C]ertain difficult and 
important cases” must be referred to these judicial committees and the collegial panel of the various courts 
are then required to implement the decision of the relevant judicial committee. CHEN, supra note 5, at 
174-175, 186-187, 200-204; Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 199. 
 133 Organic Law of the People’s Courts (人民法院组织法) was enacted in 1979, and amended in 
1983, 1986 and 2006. It mainly provides for the structure and organisation of the court system and the 
jurisdiction of courts. CHEN, supra note 5, at 176. 
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People’s Court, local People’s Courts at various levels and special 
People’s Courts such as military courts”.134 
The court system of the People’s Republic of China is based on the 
principle of “‘four levels of courts and at most two trials to conclude 
a case’ (one trial at first instance, and one trial on appeal)”.135 The 
four levels of courts comprise of thousands of basic-level people’s 
courts at county level, hundreds of intermediate people’s courts in 
cities and prefectures within provinces, higher people’s courts at the 
provincial level, and the Supreme People’s Court which exercises 
appellate jurisdiction as well as original jurisdiction in important cases 
at the national level. 136  The Supreme People’s Court also has an 
important legislative function in that it promulgates judicial 
interpretations and documents providing general rules for courts to 
follow in adjudicating cases.137 There are also specialist courts like 
military courts and maritime courts and at each of the four court levels 
there are also a number of divisions which specialise in the trial of 
different types of cases, such as criminal, civil, administrative etc.138 
Another important development in Chinese legal reform was the 
promulgation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1979, and specifically its amendment at the fourth Session 
of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 17, 1996. The 
main tenets of this major overhaul of the Chinese criminal justice 
system in 1996 were described by Landsman and Zhang as follows: 
“An accused defendant’s right to counsel was expanded and 
the rudimentary beginning of a legal aid system was put in place. 
Judges were directed to cease conducting independent 
investigations into criminal charges and instead to function as 
decision makers whose task was to weigh the prosecution’s and 
defence’s cases. Judges were still to be provided with the 
 
 134 Judges Law (法官法) was adopted at the 12th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth 
National People’s Congress on February 28, 1995. CHEN, supra note 5, at 177. 
 135 See Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts] art. 11(“In 
the administration of justice, the people’s courts adopt the system whereby the second instance is the last 
instance”). CHEN, supra note 5, at 180. 
 136 CHEN, supra note 5, at 180, 182; Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 199. Jiang, supra note 
100, at 574. 
 137 Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts] art. 31. See 
CHEN, supra note 5, at 182.  
 138 CHEN, supra note 5, at 181. 
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prosecutor’s dossier outlining the case for conviction, but were 
no longer to seek to confirm it outside the trial process. The old 
system of ‘verdict first trial second’ (先定后审 , xianding 
houshen) gave way to an approach that separated the 
prosecutorial function from the judging function.”139 
The cumulative effect of these, and other reforms have generally 
moved the Chinese criminal law and procedure from an inquisitorial 
approach to a more adversarial process.140  
A system of lay participation in legal proceedings was first 
proposed in 1906, towards the end of the Qing Dynasty (清) (1644 – 
1911), in a draft legal reform document titled the Criminal and Civil 
Procedure Law of Great Qing.141 However, the legal reforms set out 
in this document were never formally approved and it was only in 
1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, that the 
Provisional Organic Law of the People’s Courts was enacted and the 
system of people’s assessors (人民陪审员, renmin peishenyuan) was 
formally implemented. 142  Article 9 of the Organic Law of the 
People’s Courts of the PRC now enshrines the collegial system in the 
administration of justice for the People’s Republic of China.143 This 
system was later reinforced in 1954 by the Constitution which 
mandated that all first-instance cases should be heard by lay 
assessors.144 Yet, by the mid-1980s, the people’s assessors system of 
the People’s Republic of China had limited use, as many Chinese 
courts had completely suspended or dramatically limited the practice 
of empanelling people’s assessors in legal proceedings.145  
 
 139 Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 203. 
 140 Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 203. 
 141 Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 198; Zhuoyu Wang & Hiroshi Fukurai, Popular legal 
participation in China and Japan, 38 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 236, 238 (2010). Liling Yue, The Lay 
Assessor System in China 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 51, 55 (2001). 
 142 CHEN, supra note 5, at 183; Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 198. He, supra note 2, at 734. 
Yue, supra note 141, at 55. 
 143 Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts] art. 9. 
 144 Xian Fa (1954) (54年宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954)] (promulgated 
by promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 20, 1954) art. 75 (“People’s Courts should utilise the lay 
assessor system according to the law”). Reference was also made to the system of people’s assessors in 
the Constitution (1978) [78年宪法]. Constitution (1982) does not refer to the system of people’s 
assessors. CHEN, supra note 5, at 184. Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 198. 
 145 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 238; CHEN, supra note 5, at 183. 
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Many reasons exist for its failure and various attempts were made 
by the government and legislature to revive lay participation in legal 
proceedings. For example, failure to attend court for service without a 
lawful excuse was not a criminal offence or liable to punishment in 
China and this, together with the extremely low compensation did 
little to convince ordinary citizens, especially those who were 
employed, to report to court for duty. 146  In an effort to motivate 
ordinary citizens to do service at the courts, article 38 of the Organic 
Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC was amended in 1983, to 
compel courts to pay lay assessors appropriate subsidies. 147  But 
article 9 of the 1983 amendment still allocated the final decision-
making power as to when lay assessors ought to be assigned to cases 
under the jurisdiction of each individual court by providing that “cases 
of first instance shall be adjudicated by a collegial panel composed of 
judges or of judges and lay assessors: simple civil cases, minor 
criminal cases and cases otherwise prescribed by law shall be 
adjudicated by a single judge”.148  
The ineffectiveness of the mixed-tribunal system was far more 
expansive and systemic than the matter of appropriate compensation. 
Overloaded dockets and the shortage of professional judges both 
contributed to the decline in use of people’s assessors, as well as its 
abuse. This came about as professional judges could no longer handle 
the increasing caseloads and either found it impracticable to sustain 
the collegial system, or used people’s assessors as an easy substitute 
to save manpower and ease the courts’ workload by re-employing the 
same lay assessors for years or even decades as quasi full-time tribunal 
members.149 Wang and Fukurai reported that some Chinese courts 
chose to recruit unemployed people or pensioners as lay assessors and 
allocated heavy caseloads to them, effectively transforming them into 
full-time court employees.150 Article 37 of the 1983 amendment of 
the Organic Law of the People’s Courts had at aim to address this 
 
 146 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. 
 147 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 239. 
 148 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 242; CHEN, supra note 5, at 183-184. 
 149 In 1978, there were approximately 70,000 judges in China and this number doubled to 156,000 in 
1998. Yet, the caseload of all Chinese courts increased ten times in the same two decades from about 
500,000 in 1978 to 5,390,000 in 1998. Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 240-241. 
 150 These assessors were sometimes called “professional assessors” (陪审专业户). Wang & Fukurai, 
supra note 141, at 240. He, supra note 2, at 743. 
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problem by casting the net for the recruitment and appointment of lay 
assessors wide; the only requirements for lay assessors were that they 
had to be qualified voters on the electoral register, be at least twenty-
three years’ of age, and were not deprived of any political rights due 
to criminal convictions. No requirement was included with regard to 
educational achievement, language capabilities, or other possible 
disqualifications.151  
A two-stage process for the selection of lay assessors was provided 
for in the 1983 amendment: First, each court had to select lay assessors 
from the local community to form a lay assessor pool and each lay 
assessor so selected only served a fixed tenure period of two years.152 
It was only from this pool of lay assessors that courts were allowed to 
empanel a collegial. Yet, while the legislative provision required that 
the pool of lay assessors be elected by local electorates, courts rather 
made their own choices and instead of selecting randomly from a 
general list of citizens such as using the electoral register, courts 
persisted in choosing from their local community those known lay 
assessors who had served many times before and who were usually 
also unemployed or retired so as to ensure their attendance.153 This 
state of affairs was further perpetuated by the absence of a strictly 
circumscribed maximum workload for lay assessors.154 Courts and 
local governments profited from this arrangement as the additional 
costs and expenses involved in selecting and training new lay 
assessors were saved.155 (Although, Wang and Fukurai also note that 
many courts largely ignored the training of lay assessors due to 
shortage of funds and manpower.)156 Thus, by the mid-1980s the ideal 
of lay participation in legal proceedings in the People’s Republic of 
China was effectively no more than a job-scheme for a few pensioners 
 
 151 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 243. 
 152 See Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts] art 37. 
According to Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jiehe Jiceng Puxuan Xuanju Renmin Peishenyuan de 
Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于结合基层普选选举人民陪审员的通知) [Supreme Court’s Notice of 
Incorporating the Selection of Lay Assessors into the General Election] (promulgated by Sup. People’s 
Ct., Feb. 11, 1963) (Chinalawinfo), the tenure of each lay assessor was normally two years without any 
limitation of reappointment. Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. 
 153 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 240-241. 
 154 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. 
 155 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241.  
 156 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 244. 
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and the unemployed who were allocated massive caseloads and were 
effectively employed on a full-time basis as court employees.157 
The performance of people’s assessors in Chinese courtrooms at 
this time (from approximately 1949 to 2004), was equally dire. Wang 
and Fukurai explained: “A judicial adage, popular in China in 1980s 
and 1990s, which states that ‘Lay assessors accompany [judges] rather 
than adjudicate [cases],’ captures exactly the very inactive and passive 
performances of the lay assessors.” 158  Many assessors either 
remained quiet as puppets during trials or deliberations, or spoke only 
when specifically prompted to do so by a judge.159 This passivism on 
the part of the people’s assessors can be ascribed to a number of 
problems; the people’s assessors did not only complain of a lack of 
training and insufficient instructions provided by the judges, but also 
reported problems in understanding the legal questions they were 
asked to decide upon. 160  Moreover, the absence in the 1983 
amendment of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC of 
any requirement relating to literacy or educational achievement with 
regard to the selection of the assessor pool gave way to the hiring of 
illiterate citizens, simply to fill vacancies in collegial tribunals. 161 
Thus, despite article 9 of the 1983 amendment to the Organic Law of 
the People’s Courts guaranteeing that lay assessors had the same 
jurisdiction and duties as a judge, except for acting as the presiding 
judge of a collegial panel, their inability to fully understand what was 
expected of them severely impacted on their ability to participate fully 
and effectively at trial.162 In the absence of any deterrents to regulate 
the non-compliance of lay assessors with their legislative duties or to 
regulate other improprieties such as evading court service, or dozing 
 
 157 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. 
 158 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. 
 159 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 241. It is interesting to note that people in Russia used to refer 
to lay assessors as “the nodders” suggesting their minimal influence and regular acquiescence with the 
professional judge, see Machura, supra note 4, at 125; CHEN, supra note 5, at 184. 
 160 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 244. 
 161 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 243. 
 162 See also Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding 
(全国人大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective May. 1, 2005) art. 1, 10, 11, 13 
(Chinalawinfo). Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 242. 
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during the trial, the effective and fair administration of justice by way 
of a collegial panel remained a mere pipedream.163 
1. The 2004/2005 Reforms 
In light of these systemic problems and in an effort to reduce 
corruption and improve the quality of the Chinese judicial system, lay 
participation in legal proceedings was significantly revised with the 
adoption of three legal reforms.164 First, the Supreme Court of China 
submitted to the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing 
Committee, the supreme legislative authority in China, a bill for a 
Decision on the Improvement of the System of People’s Assessors in 
1999.165 This bill was later withdrawn due to a lack of support but 
was followed in August 2004 with the promulgation of a new Decision 
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Improving the System of People’s Assessors (the People’s Assessors 
Decision of 2004).166 And finally, in light of the ambiguous nature of 
the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 on various important issues 
relating to lay participation, the Supreme Court of China in association 
with the Minister of Justice promulgated the Regulation of Selecting, 
Examining and Appointing Law Assessors on 13 December 2004 and 
the Provisional Regulation of Administration of Lay Assessors on 6 
January 2005.167  
In addressing the declining use of lay assessors in Chinese legal 
proceedings, the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 specifically 
mandated the empanelling of a mixed tribunal of which the number of 
people’s assessors on the collegial panel must be no less than one-third 
of the total number of persons serving.168 Such mixed tribunals must 
be empanelled in “(1) first-instance criminal, civil and administrative 
cases with far-reaching social implications and (2) in any case in 
 
 163 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 242. 
 164 Landsman & Zhang, supra note 119, at 206. Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 237. 
 165 CHEN, supra note 5, at 184. 
 166 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
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 167 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 242-243. 
 168 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 3. 
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which the litigant(s) request(s) the application of a mixed tribunal”.169 
It is further stated that the use of a mixed tribunal in these two 
instances are mandatory unless otherwise provided for by the law and 
except for the cases to be decided by summary procedure by one judge 
sitting alone.170 Courts in the People’s Republic of China therefore no 
longer had an exclusive discretion on the decision when to initiate a 
mixed-tribunal, and litigants themselves could also apply for their case 
to be decided by a mixed tribunal.171 People’s assessors furthermore 
had to be appropriately compensated for travelling and 
accommodation costs172 and were entitled to receive allowances and 
stipends during the course of their training and assessing activities at 
the court.173 Employers of assessors were furthermore forbidden to 
reduce assessors’ salaries, bonuses or other benefits due to them 
serving at the court. 174  (Yet, while these welcome financial 
considerations with regard to the empanelling and work of lay 
assessors addressed important deficiencies of the lay participation 
system under the 1983 amendment to the Organic Law of the People’s 
Courts, unintended consequences were also abound due to persisting 
systemic problems which will be highlighted in the discussion below.) 
The provisions of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 
provided for extensive reform in terms of quality assurance: For a 
Chinese citizen to be selected as a people’s assessor under articles 4, 
 
 169 Id. art 2. Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 243. 
 170 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 2. Wang & Fukurai, supra 
note 141, at 242-243. 
 171 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 243. 
 172 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 18. 
 173 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa <Guanyu Renmin Peishenyuan Xuanren, Peixun, 
Kaohe Gongzuo de Shishi Yijian> de Tongzhi (最高人民法院、司法部关于印发《关于人民陪审员
选任、培训、考核工作的实施意见》的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry 
of Justice on Issuing the Opinions on the Work of Appointing, Training and Appraising People’s 
Assessors] (promulgated by the Sup. Ct. and the Ministry of Justice, effective Dec. 13, 2004) art 14 
(Chinalawinfo). 
 174 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 18 (making special 
provision for an alternative calculation of the allowances for unemployed lay assessors so as to 
compensate them duly given that their assessing duties deter them from seeking employment). Wang & 
Fukurai, supra note 141, at 245. 
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5 and 6 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004, he or she had to 
uphold the Chinese constitution, be above twenty-three years of age, 
be of a good moral character, physically fit, possess at least a college 
diploma, and must not have a criminal record or be a government 
official, police officer, or a legal practitioner. These requirements were 
largely the same as that of the 1983 amendment to the Organic Law of 
the People’s Courts except for the requirement that lay assessors 
serving on mixed tribunals now also had to hold at least a college 
diploma.175 While this requirement can certainly be seen as necessary 
in light of the problems experienced under the 1983 amendment, it 
also promoted elitism as it effectively eliminated approximately 
94.6% of the Chinese population from being selected as a lay 
assessor.176 In a 2005 report of the National Population and Family 
Planning Commission of China, it was recorded that only 5.4% of the 
national population held college diplomas or had attained the level of 
higher education. For the remainder of the population, it was recorded 
that 12.6% had received high school education, 36.9% graduated from 
junior high schools, and 30.4% had finished primary school 
education.177 In strictly following Article 4 of the People’s Assessors 
Decision of 2004, well-educated Chinese citizens were seemingly 
privileged contra to Article 33 of the Chinese Constitutional Law of 
1982 which provides that the citizenry of the People’s Republic of 
China are equal before law, and the article also deviated from “the 
democratic merits of lay participation” which is based on the notion 
of lay judges representing “a wide cross-section of the society” so as 
to allow for the input of “various community values, morals, norms 
and customs into the judicial decision-making process.”178 
 
 175 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 4. Wang & Fukurai, supra 
note 141, at 243. 
 176 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 250, 252. 
 177 The most recent statistics are from the 2015 National Population Survey and reflects a significant 
increase in the percentage of the national population (no 12.4%) with college diplomas or some other 
form of higher education. Similar progress has not been made with regard to other levels of education 
and training, see GUOJIA TONGJI JU (国家统计局) [NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS], 2015 NIAN 
QUANGUO 1% RENKOU CHOUYANG DIAOCHA ZHUYAO SHUJU GONGBAO (2015年全国1%人口抽样调
查主要数据公报 ) [BULLETIN ON KEY DATA OF 1% POPULATION SAMPLE SURVEY] (2015), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160420_1346151.html. Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 
250.  
 178 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 252. 
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This problem was addressed, to some extent, in Article 2 of the 
Regulation of Selecting, Examining and Appointing Law Assessors of 
2004, by granting courts a discretion in departing from this 
educational requirement in two circumstances: “(1) in rural 
jurisdictions, where the educational requirement makes it difficult to 
obtain a sufficient number of lay assessors; and (2) the availability of 
elderly candidates with lower educational attainment but who have 
excellent reputable standing in the community”.179 This concession 
was specifically directed at courts in rural areas where residents 
generally have a comparatively lower educational level.180 
The independence of people’s assessors was strengthened by way 
of articles 1, 10, 11 and 13 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004, 
which not only explicitly provided for people’s assessors enjoying 
equal rights to judges (except that they cannot serve as presiding 
judges), 181  but also recognised the right of people’s assessors to 
participate in judicial activities,182 including their independent right 
to vote.183 Article 11 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 
recognised the “principle of the minority being subordinate to the 
majority” in the practice of deliberation of cases by a collegial panel 
on which the people’s assessors constituted only one third of the 
members empanelled, and required that differences of opinion voiced 
by people’s assessors be put down in writing and, if necessary, that the 
people’s assessors may request the collegial panel to submit the case 
to the president of the people’s court for a decision as to whether to 
deliver the case to the judicial committee for discussion and decision.  
Articles 7 and 8 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 
provided for a more stringent process whereby lay assessors were to 
be selected. Wang and Fukurai described this selection process as 
follows:  
“First, each court individually decides the number of the lay 
assessors it actually needs, followed by a process of approval by 
the standing committee of the local People’s Congress at the 
 
 179 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 250. 
 180 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 250-251. 
 181 Quanguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Wanshan Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu de Jueding (全国人
大常委会关于完善人民陪审员制度的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Regarding Perfecting the System of People’s Assessors] art 1, 13. 
 182 Id. art 10. 
 183 Id. art 11. 
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same level. Secondly, Article 8 sets down three methods for 
each court to use for identifying candidates: (1) ‘self-
nomination,’ where a citizen who wants to serve as a lay 
assessor is allowed to nominate himself/herself to the local 
court; (2) ‘employer-nomination,’ where employers are 
encouraged to nominate their employees to the courts for lay 
assessor selection, after obtaining the employees’ consent; and 
(3) ‘nomination by grass-roots organisation,’184 where various 
‘grass-roots organisations’ are permitted to nominate local 
residents to the courts as lay assessor candidates after securing 
the consent of the nominees. These three nomination methods 
are intended to yield a sufficient number of candidates for the 
courts’ selection. Thirdly, these candidates are to be screened by 
each court jointly with the Department of Justice of the local 
government so that a shortlist of suitable candidates is produced. 
Fourthly, the candidates on the shortlist will be appointed by the 
standing committee of the local People’s Congress at the same 
level.”185 
Article 14 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 also required 
that each court produce a roster of eligible lay assessors selected as 
per the procedure above, and that lay assessors then be randomly 
empanelled from this roster to designated cases.186 These measures 
had at aim to address the problems previously encountered with regard 
to the poor quality of lay assessors, and the abuse of the system by 
courts who appointed the same assessors to the extent of them 
becoming full-time employees with heavy caseloads. However, 
despite these legislative amendments, the average Chinese lay 
assessor continued to carry a particularly heavy workload estimated at 
4.7 cases per year due to the relatively small cohort of the Chinese 
 
 184 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 244, (“To control and regulate the community from the very 
grass-roots level, China’s authority has respectively established the so-called ‘the Committee of Urban 
Residents’ in each town and city and ‘the Committee of Villagers’ in each village of China since 1954. 
These two ‘committees’ are often called ‘grass-roots organisation’ or ‘grass-roots mass organisation’. 
‘The Committee of Urban Residents’ and ‘the Committee of Villagers’ are respectively established in 
each block of the town or city and each village, enjoying the jurisdiction to tackle some local 
administrative affairs. See the Act of the Organisation of the Committee of Urban Residents in 1998 and 
the Act of the Organisation of the Committee of Villagers in 1998.”) 
 185 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 244. 
 186 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 245. 
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population that qualified to be selected as lay assessors. 187  This 
ultimately detracted from the “acknowledged merits of lay 
participation” which is premised on the idea that lay assessors, in 
contrast to case-hardened judges, “are normally more sensitive, 
responsive and patient in trials because they ‘are selected for a period 
of several years [i.e., tenure] and are only occasionally summoned to 
the courts to serve on a particular day.’ Rarely entering into the 
courtroom, each trial could be a whole new story for them.”188 This 
was certainly not the experience in the People’s Republic of China, 
where lay assessors continued to “act ‘out of routine’ like a judge, with 
their sensitivity and enthusiasm eroding”. 189  The relationship 
between the lay assessors appointed in terms of the People’s Assessors 
Decision of 2004 and the courts within which and judges alongside 
whom they served therefore remained tight-knitted, thwarting the 
valuable oversight function that independent and impartial lay 
participation in legal proceedings is supposed to serve. Moreover, the 
persistent heavy workload coupled with the more generous 
compensation lay assessors were entitled to pursuant to article 18 of 
the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 and article 14 of the 
Regulation of Selecting, Examining and Appointing Law Assessors of 
13 December 2004 perpetuated the risk of them becoming so 
financially dependent on the courts, that they “may bend over to 
satisfy the court, his employer, and become ‘susceptible to’ the court’s 
(and indirectly the state’s) ‘direct influence’”.190 Wang and Fukurai 
noted that it had been reported in China that “concerns such as 
‘maintenance of human relationship,’ ‘office politics,’ and ‘face 
saving’ held back the lay assessors from impeaching their professional 
colleagues even when they found the latter’s conduct to be akin to 
lawbreaking”.191 
Further legislative amendments aimed at quality assurance 
included detailed provisions with regard to the training of lay 
assessors. These were set out in article 15 of the People’s Assessors 
Decision of 2004 which assigned this training responsibility to each 
court and the Department of Justice of the local government at the 
 
 187 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 252. 
 188 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 253. 
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same level. Articles 10 to 14 of the Regulation of Selecting, 
Examining and Appointing Law Assessors of 13 December 2004 read 
with the Provisional Regulation of Administration of Lay Assessors 
of 6 January 2005 furthermore detailed and specified that courts must 
train lay assessors on the basic principles of legal knowledge, court 
rules, judicial moralities and disciplines.192 Article 19 of the People’s 
Assessors Decision of 2004 also allowed for each court to place the 
potential expenses for employing lay assessors in its normal annual 
budget which is then approved by and provided for by the local 
government.193 With regard to the training lay assessors received, it 
had been observed that contra to the educational requirement posited 
in Article 4 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 and which was 
considered above, the less educated population of the People’s 
Republic of China actually stood more to gain from being appointed 
as lay assessors as “the less educated may need this educational 
opportunity more so than the well-educated”.194  
2. The 2015, 2018 and 2019 Reforms 
The persistent and pervasive problems after the 2004/2005 reforms 
of the people’s assessor system of the People’s Republic of China did 
not go unnoticed and in April 2015, the Supreme People’s Court and 
the Ministry of Justice published the Notice of the Supreme People’s 
Court and the Ministry of Justice on Issuing the Pilot Programme on 
the Reform of the System of People’s Assessors (No. 100[2015]).195 
This document confirmed the commitment of the government of the 
People’s Republic of China to a system of lay participation in legal 
 
 192 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 244. 
 193 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 245. 
 194 Wang & Fukurai, supra note 141, at 252. See also Shari S. Diamond, What Jurors Think: 
Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY 
SYSTEM 286 (Robert E. Litan ed., Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution 1993) (observing with 
regard to the jury system generally, that citizens who had served as jurors seem to have a more positive 
opinion about the criminal justice system and the courts than citizens who came in contact with the 
criminal justice system in other ways, such as involvement as a party or a witness). Kutnjak, supra note 
2, at 100. David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation 
of a Rechtsstaat, 61 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1830 (1988). 
 195 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu Gaige Shidian Fang’an 
(最高人民法院、司法部关于印发《人民陪审员制度改革试点方案》的通知 ) [Notice of the 
Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of Justice on Issuing the Pilot Program on the Reform of the 
People’s Assessors] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Ministry of Justice. Apr. 24, 2015, effective 
Apr. 24, 2015) (Chinalawinfo). 
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proceedings196 and set out a roadmap for a two-year reform plan to be 
implemented from May 2015 in ten provinces and cities across the 
country.197 The pilot program was evaluated in May 2016, and in 
April 2018 the President of the People’s Republic of China signed into 
law the new Law of the People’s Republic of China on People’s 
Assessors of 2018, thereby repealing the People’s Assessors Decision 
of 2004.198 More recently, the 2018 reforms were further developed 
with the promulgation of the Measures of the Supreme People’s Court 
for the Training, Assessment, Reward and Punishment of the People’s 
Jurors of the Ministry of Justice, and The Interpretation of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on People’s Assessors; 
both dated 24 April 2019 and formally coming into force on 1 May 
2019.199 The most important of the reform measures will be discussed 
here.  
Article 2(1) of this 2015 Notice amended the eligibility 
requirements for being selected as a lay assessor by increasing the 
minimum age of jurors from twenty-three to twenty-eight years and 
lowering the education requirement for lay assessors in urban areas to 
a secondary (high) school diploma, while abolishing completely the 
 
 196 See also Renmin Peishenyuan Fa (人民陪审员法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
People’s Assessors] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 27, 2018, effective 
Apr. 27, 2018) art. 5, 6, 7 (Chinalawinfo) (stating that the 2018 law is “developed for purposes of 
safeguarding citizen’s participation in trial activities according to the law, promoting judicial justice, and 
improving judicial credibility”). 
 197 These are: Beijing, Heibei, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Henan, Guangxi, Chongqing, 
and Shaanxi, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu Gaige 
Shidian Fang’an (最高人民法院、司法部关于印发《人民陪审员制度改革试点方案》的通知 ) 
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of Justice on Issuing the Pilot Program on the 
Reform of the People’s Assessors]. 
 198 Renmin Peishenyuan Fa (人民陪审员法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on People’s 
Assessors] art. 32. 
 199 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Renmin Peishenyuan Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa Renmin Peishenyuan 
Peixun Kaohe Jiangcheng Gongzuo Banfa de Tongzhi (最高人民法院 司法部关于印发《人民陪审员
培训、考核、奖惩工作办法》的通知) [Measures of the Supreme People’s Court for the Training, 
Assessment, Reward and Punishment of the People’s Jurors of the Ministry of Justice] (promulgated by 
Sup. People’s Ct. & Ministry of Justice. Apr. 24, 2019, effective May.1, 2019) (Chinalawinfo) and Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Renmin Peishenyuan Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国人民陪审员法》若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
People’s Assessors] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. Apr. 24, 2019, effective May.1, 2019) 
(Chinalawinfo). 
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education requirement for lay assessors in rural areas. 200  The 
following categories of persons were explicitly barred from serving as 
lay assessors: Members of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, employees of people’s courts, people’s 
procuratorates, public security organs, state security organs, judicial 
administrative organs, practicing lawyers, people with a criminal 
record, and those who have been discharged from public employment 
or who are unable to correctly understand or express themselves. 
These provisions were subsequently adopted in the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on People’s Assessors which came into 
effect on 27 April 2018.201 It was also noted that in selecting lay 
assessors, “attention shall be paid to absorbing ordinary people, 
structure and proportion of the people from different walks of life, and 
absorbing the people of different industries, professions, ages, 
nationalities and genders, so as to reflect the various backgrounds and 
representativeness of people’s assessors”.202 This was also recognised 
in the subsequent 2018 Law which provided in article 2 that “[a]ny 
citizen has the right to serve and obligation of serving as a people’s 
assessor according to the law”.203 A mechanism of duty exemption 
was established in Article 6 of the 2015 Notice where it is stated that 
“[t]hose who have obvious difficulties in fulfilling the responsibilities 
of people’s assessors due to age, occupation, life, disease, and other 
factors may be exempted from the obligations of acting as 
assessors”.204 And, it was also suggested in the same article that a 
warning and penalty system be implemented for citizens selected and 
 
 200 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa Renmin Peishenyuan Zhidu Gaige Shidian Fang’an 
(最高人民法院、司法部关于印发《人民陪审员制度改革试点方案》的通知 ) [Notice of the 
Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of Justice on Issuing the Pilot Program on the Reform of the 
People’s Assessors].  
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Assessors] art. 5, 6, 7. 
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appointed as people’s assessors, but refuse to fulfil their 
responsibilities in this regard.205 
While articles 7 and 8 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 
provided for a more stringent process whereby lay assessors were 
selected in an effort to curb the problems experienced under the 1983 
amendment of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC, the 
2015 Notice placed the emphasis squarely on ensuring meaningful 
participation of people from all walks of life. Article 2(2) of the 2015 
Notice therefore provided for grassroots people’s courts and 
intermediate people’s courts to randomly select lay assessors from the 
list of qualified voters in their respective areas, for these assessors’ 
eligibility to be reviewed by the relevant courts in coordination with 
the judicial administrative organs at the same level, and for selected 
lay assessors to ultimately only serve a term of five years. These 
provisions were, however, not taken up in the subsequent 2018 Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on People’s Assessors. Articles 8 to 
13 of the 2018 Law rather provide for courts to submit a quota of 
people’s assessors required, and this quota may not be lower than three 
times the number of the judges serving in that particular court.206 An 
administrative organ of the judiciary together with the relevant court 
and a public security department then randomly select potential 
people’s assessors from a list of local permanent residents in its 
jurisdiction. The number of individuals so selected must be more than 
five times the number of lay assessors that will eventually be 
appointed.207  The authorities responsible for the selection process 
must then “conduct qualification examination of candidates of 
people’s assessors, and solicit opinions from such candidates”. 208 
What exactly the qualification examination entails, and the nature of 
the proposed interviews with the selected candidates, are not clarified 
in the 2018 Law. Article 10 of the 2018 Law merely indicates that the 
ultimate number of people’s assessors will then be randomly selected 
by the same administrative bodies from a list of those candidates who 
had passed the qualification examination.209 In credence to its aim of 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Renmin Peishenyuan Fa (人民陪审员法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on People’s 
Assessors] art. 8. 
 207 Id. art. 9. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. art. 10, 19. 
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ensuring lay participation from a wide and diverse range of individuals 
from all walks of life, article 11 provides for the list of possible 
candidates from which the lay assessors will ultimately be appointed 
to be supplemented with applications filed by interested citizens, as 
well as recommendations made by employers and grass-root 
organisations. Such candidates, having applied themselves or having 
been nominated must also undergo the qualification examination and 
if selected may not exceed one fifth of the total number of the quota 
of people’s assessors.210 Article 7 of the 2015 Notice directed that a 
guarantee system must be established by way of formulating an oath 
which lists all the rights and obligations of Chinese lay assessors and 
which would ultimately safeguard the authority of the system of 
people’s assessors.211 This has been given effect to in article 12 of the 
2018 Law which requires of all people’s assessors to be publicly 
sworn into office at a swearing-in ceremony organised by the relevant 
court and administrative authorities. Finally, Article 13 of the 2018 
Law prescribes a five-year tenure for people’s assessors and direct that 
people’s assessors selected and appointed under the provisions of this 
Law may not be reappointed. 
The scope of participation for lay assessors in legal proceedings 
was significantly widened in terms of the 2015 Notice as it was 
required that all criminal, civil, or administrative cases of the first 
instance that concerned the interest of a certain group, or public 
interests generally, or that attracted much attention from the general 
public, or was of other social influence, had to be heard by a mixed 
tribunal consisting of a professional judge with lay assessors.212 All 
criminal cases of the first instance where the offender was in jeopardy 
of being sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment or life imprisonment 
also had to be heard by a mixed tribunal consisting of a professional 
judge with lay assessors and all criminal, civil, or administrative cases 
where the accused or litigant requested for the case to be heard by a 
mixed tribunal also had to be adjudicated under this system of people’s 
assessors.213 These provisions have been retained in modified form in 
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the 2018 Law, but was significantly limited in the 2019 Interpretation 
of the Supreme People’s Court. Article 5 of this 2019 Interpretation 
states that people’s assessors shall not participate in cases that are 
subject to trial under special procedures, supervision procedures, and 
public notice procedures in accordance with the Civil Procedure Law, 
or cases on application for recognition of a divorce judgment of a 
foreign court, or cases that are rejected based on a ruling or of which 
a court trial is not required. 214  In terms of Article 6 of the 2019 
Interpretation, people’s assessors may also not participate in the trial 
of a case in which they had previously mediated in the capacity of 
people’s mediator.215 
Under the 2018 Law, litigants no longer have a general right to 
request for their case to be adjudicated by a collegial panel. Article 17 
of the 2018 Law now states that where such a request is made by a 
litigant, “the people’s court may decide” whether the request will be 
granted. However, in a further Interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court issued on 24 April 2019, and which came into force on 1 May 
2019, parties have the right, under Article 7 of the Interpretation, to 
apply for the withdrawal/recusal of people’s assessors in terms of the 
same legal provisions applicable to applications made for the 
withdrawal/recusal of judges.216  
Provision is made in Article 14 of the 2018 Law for a three-
member collegial panel consisting of one presiding judge and two 
people’s assessors, and a seven-member collegial panel consisting of 
three judges and four people’s assessors. A seven-member collegial 
panel presides over the following cases of first instance: 
“Article 16 […] 
(1) Criminal cases with great social impacts where a fixed-
term imprisonment of not less than ten years’ life imprisonment 
or death penalty may be sentenced. 
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(2) Public welfare lawsuits filed in accordance with the Civil 
Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Administrative Litigation law of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(3) Cases involving land requisition and house demolition, 
ecology and environment protection, and food and drug safety, 
and with great social impacts. 
(4) Other cases with great social impacts.” 
By inference then it can be accepted that the provisions of article 
15 refer to those cases over which a three-member collegial panel will 
preside: 
“Article 15 When the people’s court tries a criminal, civil, 
or administrative case of first instance and the case falls under 
any of the following circumstances, people’s assessors and 
judges shall form a collegial panel to try the case: 
(1) Involving the interests of a certain group or public 
interests. 
(2) Attracting extensive attention of the general public or 
otherwise having great social impacts. 
(3) Having complicated case circumstances or falling under 
any other circumstances, which requires people’s assessors to 
participate in the trial. 
Where the people’s court tries a case as prescribed in the 
preceding paragraph, if law prescribes that the case should be 
tried by a sole judge or a collegial panel consisting of judges, 
such provision shall prevail.” 
The process of adjudication itself was noted in Article 4 of the 2015 
Notice where it was stated, inter alia, that lay assessors must have a 
reasonable workload, have access to pre-trial records for effective 
facilitation of participation in hearings, and ultimately also in the 
decision-making process. It was noted that people’s assessors may 
assist with mediation amongst litigants where appropriate, and that all 
opinions of lay assessors had to be recorded in the court transcript 
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which must ultimately be signed by the presiding judge together with 
the assessors. Lay assessors were also barred from deciding on matters 
of law as per Article 5 of the 2015 Notice and could “only participate 
in the trial of the issues concerning fact finding”.217 As to what would 
constitute an acceptable verdict it was explained as follows: 
“People’s assessors and judges shall jointly be responsible 
for the fact finding. In the case of difference in opinions, case 
facts shall be identified according to the majority opinions. 
However, the minority opinions shall be recorded in the 
transcript. In the case of significant differences in the majority 
opinions of judges and people’s assessors, and the case finding 
in the majority opinions of people’s assessors has violated the 
rules of evidence, which may lead to error in the application of 
law or give rise to a misjudged case, the case may be submitted 
to the president of the court to decide whether the case shall be 
discussed by the judicial committee.”218 
The process of adjudication under the 2015 Notice was not adopted 
in the 2018 Law of the People’s Republic of China on People’s 
Assessors. Articles 20 to 23 set out the process of adjudication under 
the 2018 Law and direct that the presiding judge on a collegial panel 
has the obligation to guide the course of the proceedings but not in a 
manner that will obstruct the people’s assessors from making 
independent judgments. However, it is stated that “[i]n the 
deliberation of a case…the presiding judge shall make necessary 
interpretations and explanations to people’s assessors on the fact-
finding, rules of evidence, legal provisions and other matters, and 
issues to which attention should be paid”.219 Article 23 of the 2018 
Law affirms the application of the rule of majority and, similar to the 
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People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 and the 2015 Notice, provides 
for dissenting opinions to be recorded and referred where necessary. 
The remainder of the 2018 provisions setting out the process of 
adjudication deserve to be quoted in full below as a distinction is made 
in the process of adjudication of a three-member panel, and the process 
of adjudication of a seven-member panel.  
“Article 21 When people’s assessors participate in a three-
member collegial panel to try a case, they shall independently 
make comments on fact-finding or application of law and 
exercise the right to vote. 
Article 22 When people’s assessors participate in a seven-
member collegial panel to try a case, they shall independently 
make comments on fact-finding and vote jointly with judges; 
and they may make comments on the application of law, but may 
not participate in the voting. 
Article 23 When deliberating a case, a collegial panel shall 
adhere to the rule of majority. Where people’s assessors have 
dissenting opinions with other members of the collegial panel, 
the opinions of such people’s assessors shall be recorded in the 
transcripts. 
Where members of a collegial panel have significant 
dissenting opinions, people’s assessors or judges may require of 
the collegial panel to submit the case to the president of the 
people’s court for decision on whether the case should be 
submitted to the judicial committee for discussion and 
decision.” 
Thus, in terms of Article 21 and Article 22 of the 2018 Law, 
people’s assessors serving on a three-member panel may decide 
independently and vote together with judges on matters relating to fact 
alone, as well as matters relating to the application of law to the facts. 
The same, however, is not true of the adjudication process of a seven-
member collegial panel as Article 22 directs that such people’s 
assessors serving on a seven-member panel my only decide and vote 
independently on matters relating to fact. With regard to the 
application of law to these facts these lay assessors may make 
comments but have no voting rights. How exactly this distinction in 
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voting rights with regard to issues of fact and the application of law to 
these facts were to function in practice, was not set out in the 2018 
Law. He suggested that the seven-member collegial panel may very 
well end up an example of where the first character ( 陪 , 
accompanying) in the Chinese word for lay participation (陪审) is 
implemented, while the second character ( 审 , adjudicating) is 
ignored.220 This lacuna was subsequently addressed in Article 9 and 
Article 13 of the 2019 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court: 
“Article 9 The seven-member collegial panel shall, before 
the court session, produce a list of fact finding issues, 
differentiate fact finding issues and the issues on the application 
of law according to specific case circumstances, and enumerate 
the facts in issue item by item for the reference of people’s 
assessors in court trial. If the fact-finding issue and the issue on 
the application of law can hardly be differentiated, it shall be 
deemed as the issue on the determination of facts.  
Article 13 When the seven-member collegial panel 
deliberates a case, the presiding judge shall summarise and 
introduce the issues on the determination of case facts that need 
to be decided through deliberation, and give the list of issues on 
case facts.  
People’s assessors shall participate in the deliberation of the 
collegial panel throughout the entire process. People’s assessors 
and judges shall vote on the issues on the determination of facts 
based on joint deliberation. People’s assessors shall not 
participate in voting on the issues on the application of laws, but 
they may offer their opinions and record them in files.”221  
The rights and duties of people’s assessors are now provided for 
under articles 3, 4, 18, and 24 to 31 of the 2018 Law, and to a large 
extent mirror the advances that have been made in this regard since 
the 1983 amendment to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the 
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PRC.222 Whether these are sufficient only time will tell, as it was 
reported in 2005, and despite the already expansive amendments in 
effect at that time under the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004, that 
“a total of 45,697 Chinese lay assessors participated in 164,630 cases 
of various trials. However, due to the problems in schedule 
arrangements, expenditure payments, and work-related 
responsibilities, nearly half of lay assessors failed to carry out their 
civic duties.”223 Of the legal reforms promulgated up to 2004/5 to 
ensure effective and meaningful lay participation in the adjudication 
process of the People’s Republic of China, Landman and Zhang noted 
that “[i]t is possible to interpret China’s people’s assessors program as 
democratic window dressing on a centrally-controlled legal system 
that is not open to the rule of law, but rather seeks to use the law to 
control the citizenry. There is, however, evidence that China is 
earnestly seeking to improve its justice system, and that the people’s 
assessor programme is a step in that effort.”224 A case in point is 
Article 17 of the 2019 Interpretation which now limits the number of 
cases people’s assessors in the intermediate and basic people’s courts 
may adjudicate to a maximum of thirty cases per assessor.225 The 
continuous legal reform project of the system of people’s assessors in 
the adjudication of legal proceedings in the People’s Republic of 
China certainly reflects the government’s commitment to promote 
judicial justice and judicial credibility through effective lay 
participation in legal proceedings in the People’s Republic of China.226 
In stark contrast to this ongoing legislative process of ensuring lay 
participation in legal proceedings of the People’s Republic of China, 
is the entrenched process of lay participation in the legal proceedings 
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of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, one of the PRC’s 
Special Administrative Regions. In Hong Kong, the erstwhile 
institutions of a former colonial master have ostensibly been 
internalised as curious cultural-legal artefacts, and lay participation in 
the adjudication of legal disputes must for this reason, be properly 
understood in terms of its contemporary post-colonial context. 
B. Trial by Jury in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
The jury system of Hong Kong was, like most of its legal 
institutions, imported to Hong Kong by its colonising power, the 
United Kingdom.227 Duff et al described the Hong Kong jury as one 
of the earliest features of the English criminal justice system to be 
adopted in Hong Kong in 1845.228 However, right from the get-go, 
the Hong Kong jury featured different characteristics from that of the 
jury system in England and Wales. Originally the Hong Kong jury 
only comprised six men, rather than twelve like its counterpart in 
England and Wales, with the “smallness of the population” cited as its 
rationale, as it was believed that a twelve men jury would cause “very 
great hardship and inconvenience” to the colonial inhabitants.229 In 
1864, the number of jury members was increased to seven and it has 
remained at this number ever since. However, in 1986, in anticipation 
of a complicated trial involving commercial fraud – a case that later 
became known as the Carrian case – legislation was hurriedly passed 
so as to allow for a court to order that a jury should comprise nine and 
not seven persons.230 This was thought to be necessary as the trial was 
expected to last for many months, even years, and in such cases there 
are always a risk that some of the jury members will withdraw, which 
may lead to the abandonment of the trial if the number of jurors fall 
below the requisite five. 231  This discretion to expand a jury from 
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seven to nine members also exists to this day in terms of section 3 of 
the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3). 
Another difference between the early Hong Kong jury system and 
its British counterpart was that the original Hong Kong Ordinance of 
1845 imposed a financial qualification for jury service in that a jury 
member had to either hold property as owner or tenant with a monthly 
value of HK$25 upwards, or be in receipt of a salary of more than 
HK$1000 per annum. While this property and financial qualification 
for jury service was dropped from the list of requirements for jury duty 
in Hong Kong in 1851, the comparable property qualification for jury 
duty in England and Wales was only abandoned some one hundred 
years later.232 Also, the 1851 Hong Kong Ordinance disqualified any 
person from jury duty who was ignorant of the English language, 233 
and language competency remains a ground for disqualification for 
Hong Kong jury service to this day. 234 Similar issues concerning 
language were obviously not as problematic with regard to jury service 
in England and Wales. A major historical difference between the Hong 
Kong jury system and its British counterpart is with regard to the 
verdict handed down by a jury. By 1851, a verdict by a majority of the 
jury members was accepted in terms of Hong Kong law, while 
England and Wales continued to hold that only a unanimous verdict 
will be acceptable in terms of the law.235 It was only in 1967 that a 
majority verdict also became acceptable in English law.236 
At present, article 86 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that 
“[t]he principle of trial by jury previously practiced in Hong Kong 
shall be maintained,” and section 41 of the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance (Cap 221) provides that the general mode of trial in Hong 
Kong is for a person to be tried before a court on an indictment, and 
that such a trial shall “be had by and before a judge and a jury”.237 
Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221) 
furthermore empowers the Secretary for Justice to, by way of a 
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motion, request that a judge order the trial of any indictment to “be 
had at bar, that is to say, by and before two judges and a jury…”238 
However, only trials before the Court of First Instance and in the 
coroner’s court will be heard by both a judge and a jury. Trials in a 
Magistrate’s Court will be dealt with by a magistrate only and trials in 
the District Court are dealt with by a judge, also in the absence of a 
jury.239  
It has previously been questioned whether the jury system should 
not also be extended to the District Court of Hong Kong, especially 
given the historical significance of a trial by jury in most common law 
systems and particularly that of England and Wales. 240 The Hong 
Kong District Court was established in 1953 as an intermediate court 
with both civil and criminal jurisdiction and with the purpose to relief 
the workload on both the Magistrate’s Court and the High Court (as it 
was known at that time). 241  The District Court was furthermore 
established to provide for a trial by a judge in the absence of a jury as 
the historically stringent eligibility requirements for jury duty 
described above, especially with regard to language competency, also 
resulted in the overburdening a relatively small cohort of the Hong 
Kong population for having to perform jury duty. 242  While the 
reasons for the establishment of the Hong Kong District Court, 
providing for a trial by a judge in the absence of a jury, may not be as 
pressing today as it was in the 1950s, it would not be advisable to 
extend the trial by jury in Hong Kong to also include trials at the 
District Court level. Of this, the following was said by the Secretary 
for Justice, Mr Wong Yan Lung SC in the Legislative Council on 11 
November 2009:  
“This issue was last raised in the Legislative Council in 
March 1997 and…it was said that any change at the present 
arrangements would require a lengthy, detailed and in-depth 
study. Having reviewed the matters set out in that paper and 
having consulted the Judiciary, the Administration is not 
convinced that a re-examination of this issue is warranted. The 
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number of criminal cases tried in Chinese in the District Court 
has shown a steady increase in recent years, while the number 
of those in the Court of First Instance has shown no comparable 
increase. Since 2007, the availability of an increased pool of 
Chinese speaking jurors has not led to an increase in jury trials 
in Chinese in the Court of First Instance. It appears unlikely 
therefore that the introduction of jury trials in the District Court 
would lead to an increased use of Chinese in that Court…The 
resource implications and the demand on jurors would also be 
very considerable if the same number of cases were to be tried 
each year.”243 
1. General Principles regarding the Composition and 
Adjudication Process of the Contemporary Hong Kong Jury  
In a trial involving both a judge and a jury, the jury is tasked with 
settling disputed questions of fact and making a finding on whether 
the accused person is guilty or innocent of the offences charged. The 
judge, on the other hand, must decide on all questions of law, must 
decide if there is a prima facie case against an accused upon a 
submission of “no case to answer”, supervise the conduct of the trial 
and regulate its processes and procedures, and also give appropriate 
instructions and guidance to the jury members. On this last point, it 
must be noted that a judge can exercise great influence over the 
decisions that a jury makes, for example, a judge may rule that certain 
evidence be excluded from the jury’s consideration, or direct the jury 
to exclude a particular verdict or to consider a possible verdict, or give 
directions to the jury as to important evidence and its evaluation. A 
judge can also discharge a jury if there had been an irregularity and it 
is unsafe to allow for the jury to conclude a verdict or in extreme cases, 
a judge may even overturn the verdict of a jury if it is perverse or 
plainly wrong. It is ultimately also the judge that is tasked with 
handing down a sentence where the jury has returned a verdict of 
guilty. In deciding upon an appropriate sentence, the judge will also 
deal with questions of fact that may arise from a plea in mitigation of 
sentence. The jury therefore, does not decide on the admissibility of 
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evidence, argument or decisions, or consider motions to quash an 
indictment for failing to state an offence known to law.  
In Hong Kong, the composition of a jury and the procedural 
matters related thereto is provided for in the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).244 
Section 3 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) states that in all civil and 
criminal trials and in all inquiries into “idiocy, lunacy, or unsoundness 
of mind of any person, the jury, if any, shall consist of seven persons 
except where the court or the judge before whom any such trial or 
inquiry is or may be heard, orders that the jury shall consist of nine 
persons.”245 This is further explicated in section 20 of the Ordinance 
where it is stated that a judge has a discretion, on an application made 
by or on behalf of the parties, or even at the judge’s own instance, to 
order that the jury shall be composed of men only or of women only 
as the case may require.246 A judge also has the power to exempt any 
person from jury duty upon an application made by such a person and 
in respect of any case by reason of the nature of the evidence to be 
given or the issues to be tried.247 
As to the question who is eligible for jury duty in Hong Kong, 
regard must be had to sections 4, 4A, and 5 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 
3).248 Section 4 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) sets out the baseline 
requirements for eligibility and disqualifications for being called upon 
to serve as a jury member in Hong Kong: 
“Section 4 Qualifications and disabilities 
(1) A person who has reached 21 years of age, but not 65 
years of age, and is a resident of Hong Kong is, except as 
provided by this Ordinance, liable to serve as a juror in the 
proceedings in the court or in an inquest under the Coroners 
Ordinance Cap 504 if (but only if) –  
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(a) the person is of sound mind and not afflicted by 
blindness, deafness or other disability preventing the person 
from serving as a juror; and 
(b) the person is of good character; and 
(c) the person has a sufficient knowledge of the language in 
which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to 
understand the proceedings. 
(2) In a trial before a jury, the court or a coroner may, on the 
court or the coroner’s own motion or on the application of the 
Registrar or of any interested party, discharge any person 
summoned to serve as a juror who is unable to satisfy the court 
or the coroner that the person’s knowledge of the language in 
which the proceedings are to be conducted is sufficient to enable 
the person to understand the proceedings.” 
In order to ensure that persons identified as eligible jury members 
do indeed meet the baseline requirements as set out in section 4 of the 
Jury Ordinance (Cap 3), the Registrar of the High Court or the 
Commissioner in terms of the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap 
177) may request of eligible jury members to supply certain 
information or to undergo an English or Chinese language 
examination.249 The following categories of persons are furthermore 
explicitly excluded from service as jurors: Members of the Executive 
or Legislative Council, justices of peace, certain public officers 
including members of the Hong Kong judiciary, staff members of 
certain public offices, members of the Hong Kong Police Force, 
consuls, barristers-at-law and solicitors as well as their clerks, persons 
duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners under the 
Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161) or dentists under the 
Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap 156), or persons duly registered 
under the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance (Cap 529), 
editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong, chemists and druggists 
actually carrying on business as such, various religious leaders and 
practitioners, full-time students, members of the Chinese People’s 
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Liberation Army, pilots, and the spouses of certain public officials like 
that of the Chief Justice, a judge of the Court of Final Appeal etc.250 
Even where a person meets all the requirements for eligibility to 
serve as a jury member in Hong Kong and as set out in sections 4, 4A, 
and 5 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3), statutory provisions empower the 
court and the Registrar to exempt a jury member,251 and allows for 
the prosecution as well as the defence to exercise some choice in the 
selection of jury members at the stage when the jury is empanelled.252 
Typical examples of where such an application for exemption of jury 
duty will be allowed, includes instances where the jury member has a 
personal interest in the case or have knowledge of the parties, where 
serving on the jury would result in the jury member suffering some 
form of hardship, including financial hardship, and any other issue of 
practical significance. It also remains possible for a court at any time 
during the trial and prior to the verdict of the jury being handed down, 
to discharge any juror where, in the interests of justice, it appears to 
the court expedient to do so, or where it is in the interests of the juror 
to do so.253 Where a member of the jury dies or is discharged by the 
court, the jury shall nonetheless be considered as remaining properly 
constituted for all the purposes of the trial.254 Such a jury, sans the 
member who was discharged or who had died, shall proceed as if the 
full number of jurors are present and any verdict returned by the 
remaining members being a unanimous verdict or a majority verdict 
shall be of equal validity as if it had been returned by a jury consisting 
of the full number of jurors.255 A jury may, however, never consist of 
less than five persons.256 
Jury members in Hong Kong are paid an allowance in terms of 
section 31 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3), at a rate determined by the 
Chief Executive from time to time and published in the Gazette.257 In 
addition to an allowance, a jury member can also receive an additional 
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allowance for a case where necessary and justified.258 Where a juror, 
having been duly served with a summons fails to attend, or being 
present, does not appear when called, or after appearance withdraws 
himself without the permission of a judge, such a juror shall be guilty 
of an offence and will be liable to a fine unless he or she can show 
some reasonable cause for the failure to comply with the summons or 
for nor appearing or for withdrawing without permission.259 In terms 
of section 32(3) such failure on the part of a juror may also be 
punishable as “a criminal contempt of court committed in the face of 
the court”.260 
Similar to other legal systems in the world with adjudication 
processes that provides for jury trials, the primary focus of legal 
concern subsequent to a jury verdict having been handed down usually 
relates to the summing up of the judge to the jury at the end of the 
legal proceedings and before the jury is sent away for deliberation,261 
as well as the pivotal requirement that a jury not investigate or receive 
evidence or be influenced in any manner whatsoever both during the 
course of the trial as well as during deliberations.262 Also, as in other 
common law jurisdictions, the question has been raised in Hong Kong 
whether the lay jury is truly capable of comprehending the evidence 
and arguments led in a complex trial, and casting an appropriate 
verdict as to the guilt or innocence of an accused in complex 
proceedings. So-called “complex” criminal proceedings usually refer 
to cases which involve one or more of the following general features:  
“First, there is the existence of a number of defendants with 
multiple charges against each. The difficulty for the jury in those 
circumstances is that of remembering who is who and who is 
 
 258 Id. section 31(2). 
 259 Id. section 32(1)-(2). 
 260 Id. section 32(3). 
 261 Hong Kong case law reveal the manner in which the presiding judge explains to the jury how they 
should deliberate and ultimately preferably reach a majority verdict. Important case law from Hong Kong 
and England and Wales include the following: Pun Luen Pan v. HKSAR [2008] 2 HKLRD 404; HKSAR 
v. Chan Ka Man [2005] 1 HKC 162; R v. Watson [1988] QB 690; Black v. R [1993] 179 CLR 44; R v. 
Accused [1988] 2 NZLR 46; Tam King Hon v. HKSAR [2006] HKCU 569; R v. Atlan [2004] EWCA 
Crim 1798; Lam Chi Kwong v. HKSAR [2008] HKCFA 97; Cheung Chi Keung v. HKSAR (2009) 12 
HKCFAR 502; Cai Zong Gang v. HKSAR (2009) 12 HKCFAR 494; HKSAR v. Kwok Chi Wai [2004] 
HKCA 251. 
 262 See, e.g., HKSAR v. Chan Huandai [2016] HKCU 447; Ellis v. Deheer [2010] EWCA Crim 1623 
[2011] 1 W.L.R. 200; R v. Thompson [2011] 2 All ER 85; R v. Blackwell [1995] 2 Cr App R 625; R v. 
Oke [1997] Crim LR 898; R v. Orgles [1994] 1 WLR 108. 
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accused of what. Another problem concerns the jury’s lack of 
experience in the world of high finance and international trading 
which represents the backdrop to most commercial fraud cases. 
The length of such trials was seen as a further feature of 
complexity. This is thought to be perhaps the most significant 
cause of juror dissatisfaction and results from the disruption 
which long jury service causes to the lives of ordinary citizens. 
Fourth, the jury faces the problem of maintaining an adequate 
degree of concentration for long periods and, consequently, of 
understanding the issues…Another factor is the sheer volume of 
the evidence itself. Much of it may be in the form of documents 
placed before the jury and these may run into thousands of pages 
and are usually difficult to digest.”263  
This question, as to whether a jury trial is indeed the most 
appropriate mode of trial for complex cases is a question that has 
already been raised in English law in 1984, in what became known as 
“the Roskill Report on Fraud Trials”.264 In this report it was noted that 
“[t]he increasing sophistication of business aids such as computers and 
the development of instant communication at an international as well 
as local level means that fraud investigations and trials are acquiring a 
new dimension.”265 The Council responsible for this report, however, 
was not convinced that it could be shown that the average juror was 
any less capable of understanding and weighing the issues in a case of 
serious fraud, for example, than in any other serious criminal case.266 
Similar concerns with regard to the trial by jury for complex 
commercial crimes were also raised in Hong Kong in 1979.267 These 
concerns were further exacerbated with a series of criminal 
proceedings against Carrian Holdings Ltd from 1986 to 1995,268 and 
 
 263 DUFF ET AL., supra note 228, at 43-44; for recent examples of complex commercial crime cases in 
Hong Kong see HKSAR v. Yeung Ka Sing & Carson [2016] HKCFA 52; (2016) 19 HKCFAR 279; 
[2016] 5 HKC 166; FACC 5/2015 (11 July 2016); HKSAR v. Tsang Yau May [2017] HKCA 101; CACC 
16/2016 (10 March 2017); HKSAR v. Jariabka Juraj [2016] HKCA 512; [2017] 2 HKC 207; CACC 
321/2014 (27 October 2016); and HKSAR v. Tai Chi Wah and another [2008] HKCA 78; CACC 
497/2006 (22 February 2008). 
 264 BERYL COOPER ET AL., FRAUD TRIALS 21 (London Justice, 1984). 
 265 Cooper, supra note 264, at 1.  
 266 Cooper, supra note 264, at 22. See also R v. Simmonds [1967] 51 CAR 316.  
 267 DUFF ET AL., supra note 228, at 43 and 44. 
 268 The Carrian case lasted no less than 280 actual sitting days in court, of which the jury was out of 
court for 115 days, the judge delivered 53 rulings in the jury’s absence, and the Crown called 104 
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also with the passing of the Complex Commercial Crimes Ordinance 
(Cap 394) in 1988. Of these concerns Peter Duff and his co-authors 
noted that “[a]s was the case in England, the expression of concern 
about the role of the jury in complicated fraud trials was often a 
symptom of a more general and underlying unease about the whole 
institution of trial by jury and, in particular, a product of doubts about 
the competence of the jury to perform its task.”269  
With regard to the role of lay juries in complex criminal 
proceedings, the development of the English law and the Hong Kong 
law took divergent paths. In England and Wales, the Criminal Justice 
Act (Cap 44) was enacted in 2003 and allows for the prosecution to 
make an application for certain trials to be conducted without a jury. 
Section 43 of the Act relates to proceedings where the “complexity of 
the trial or the length of the trial (or both) is likely to make the trial so 
burdensome to the members of a jury hearing the trial that the interests 
of justice require that serious consideration should be given to the 
question of whether the trial should be conducted without a jury.” 
And, section 44 of the Act relates to proceedings where there is 
“evidence of a real and present danger that jury tampering would take 
place…[and] notwithstanding any steps (including the provision of 
police protection) which might reasonably be taken to prevent jury 
tampering, the likelihood that it would take place would be so 
substantial as to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the 
trial to be conducted without a jury.” In Hong Kong, in turn, the 
Complex Commercial Crimes Ordinance (Cap 394) did not abolish 
trial by jury in cases involving complicated commercial crimes. It 
rather incorporated in the final draft of the Ordinance several measures 
designed to make such trials less complex and easier for the jury to 
follow. These measures include the following: “Provision is made for 
a preparatory hearing before the jury is empanelled, for the purpose of 
identifying material issues, expediting the proceedings, assisting the 
jury’s comprehension and helping the judge. Thus much greater 
emphasis is placed on the pre-trial stage.”270  
 
witnesses. The defendants in this case were ultimately acquitted by the jury. DUFF ET AL., supra note 228, 
at 45. 
 269 DUFF ET AL., supra note 228, at 43. 
 270 See, e.g., Jury Ordinance, Cap. 3, § 13 (H.K.) (BLIS). which allows for the submission of 
documentary evidence which would otherwise have been inadmissible in the proceedings, but which may 
serve as explanatory material which can be helpful to aid comprehension by the jury. DUFF ET AL., supra 
note 228, at 46-47. 
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C. Peers, Process, and Projection 
The analysis and discussion in the preceding parts traced the legal-
historical development of the medieval modes of proof, to the 
contemporary modes of adjudication and the rudiments of the two 
dominant legal traditions – the common law and the civil law tradition 
– which were ultimately transplanted throughout the world through 
conquest, colonization and legal reform. The jury trial and the mixed 
court or tribunal as distinctive features of the common law and civil 
tradition respectively, have also found application in the “East”, and 
the unique adaptations of both these legal transplantations were 
considered with reference to the laws of the Special Administrative 
Region of Hong Kong and the ongoing legislative project of the 
People’s Republic of China (respectively). While these two 
jurisdictions may have different legal systems, they are bound together 
by the principle of one country two systems,271 as well as its people, 
the majority of whom are ethnic Chinese. The general acceptance of 
late that a close relationship exists between law and culture, each 
partaking in, reflecting, and refracting the other, the impact of 
dominant cultural views and practices on the operation, deliberation, 
and ultimate verdict of a legal relic like that of the jury system and in 
a post-colonial world cannot be ignored. In the discussion that follows, 
therefore, the characteristic collectivist Chinese culture will briefly be 
outlined for as far as it may be relevant to the operation, deliberation 
 
 271 This statement also refers to the constitutional principle of “one country two systems” formulated 
by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s as a way to reconcile the socialist Mainland with its territories—
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau which are allowed to maintain their capitalist economies and own laws 
and legal systems. See Xianfa (宪法) [Constitution] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec 4, 
1982, effective Dec 8, 1982) art. 31 (Chinalawinfo) (“The state may establish special administrative 
regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed 
by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of specific conditions.”) . See also Sino-
British Joint Declaration, China-Gr. Brit., art. 3(11), Dec. 19, 1984 which provides as follows:  
“[T]he above-stated basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the 
elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, by the National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.”  
Finally, see the preamble to the Hong Kong Basic Law which was promulgated on Apr. 4, 1990 and came 
into effect on July 1, 1997 and where it is stated as follows:  
“…the People’s Republic of China has decided that upon China’s resumption of the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be established in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
and that under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, the socialist system and policies will not 
be practiced in Hong Kong.” 
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and ultimate verdict cast by lay participants in criminal legal 
proceedings in the People’s Republic of China and its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong.  
In 1980, Gerard Hendrik (Geert) Hofstede, a Dutch social 
psychologist, published one of the most comprehensive studies on 
national values at that time, and introduced an important dimension of 
cultural variations by way of his “cultural dimension theory”. 272 
Individualism, according to Hofstede, “pertains to societies in which 
the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look 
after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” 273 
Individuals in individualistic societies therefore, “view themselves as 
independent of collectives and…give priority to their personal goals 
over the goals of others.” 274  Countries found to be high on the 
individualistic end of what Hofstede called the “cultural dimension” 
included most northern and western regions of Europe, as well as 
North America. 275  Conversely, Hofstede found collectivism as a 
cultural pattern common in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central, and 
South America, as well as the Pacific.276 He defined collectivism as 
the opposite of individualism, pertaining “to societies in which people 
from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, 
which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty”.277 Collectivism is therefore “a 
social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see 
themselves as part of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, 
tribe, nation) and are willing to give priority to the goals of these 
collectives over their own personal goals.”278 Individualism can be 
characterised by three critical features: “(a) emphasis on distinct and 
 
 272 GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK 
RELATED VALUES (Beverly Hill, Sage 1980).  
 273 GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND 51 (London, 
McGraw Hill 1991). 
 274 Stella Ting-Toomey & Atsuko Kurogi, Facework Competence in Intercultural Conflict: An 
Updated Face-Negotiation Theory, 22 INT’L J. OF INTERCULTURAL REL. 187, 190 (1998). 
 275 Id. HOFSTEDE, supra note 273, at 51. 
 276 It is interesting to note, that less than one-third of the world population resides in cultures with high 
individualistic value tendencies, and more than two-thirds of the world’s population live in cultures with 
high collectivistic value tendencies. Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, supra note 274, at 190. 
 277 HOFSTEDE, supra note 273, at 51. 
 278 John Oetzel et al., Face and Facework in Conflict: A Cross-cultural Comparison of China, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 68 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 235, 239 (2001). 
 246 TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:183 
autonomous individuals, (b) separation from ascribed relationships 
such as family, community, and religion, and (c) emphasis on abstract 
principles, rules, and norms that guide the individual’s thoughts, 
feelings, and actions”. 279  And for collectivism, in turn, two main 
types exist: Horizontal collectivism generally refers to the team 
orientation of a group of people working together to the benefit of the 
group as a whole, and vertical collectivism refers to the tendency of 
people in a society to obey and be subordinate to laws and authority. 
This too is a form of collectivism as the collective interests and 
security of the group or society as a whole are advanced when people 
conform to societal norms and authority.280  
Traditional Chinese culture shares characteristics of both 
horizontal and vertical collectivism. For example, in terms of 
Confucian teachings, social harmony and collective benefits are 
particularly important and deference to societal norms, laws, and 
authority, as well as in terms of interpersonal relationships, are 
essential. “Face” is furthermore a particularly important value in terms 
of traditional Chinese culture. The Chinese cultural concept of “face” 
can be described as “the positive social value a person effectively 
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a 
particular contact”.281 Erving Goffman explains: “A person may be 
said to have, or be in, or maintain face when the line he effectively 
takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is 
supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants, 
 
 279 Uichol Kim, Chapter 9 Asian Collectivism: An Indigenous Perspective in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
PSYCHOLOGY 147, 149 (Hendry S.R. Kao & Durganand Sinha eds., Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications 1997). 
 280 In 1980, Hofstede characterized individualist societies in emphasizing “I consciousness, autonomy, 
emotional independence, individual initiative, right to privacy, pleasure seeking, financial security, need 
for specific friendship, and universalism”. And collectivist societies in emphasizing “we consciousness, 
collective identity, emotional dependence, group solidarity, sharing, duties and obligations, need for 
stable and predetermined friendship, group decision, and particularism”. Kim, supra note 279, at 2, 
quoting HOFSTEDE, supra note 273. 
 281 ERVING GOFFMAN, On Face-work An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, in 
INTERACTION RITUAL ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOUR 5, 5 (Penguin Books 1967); John Oetzel et 
al. define “face” as “an individual’s claimed sense of positive image in the context of social interaction”. 
Oetzel, supra note 278, at 235. Stella Ting-Toomey and Atsuko Kurogi define “face” as “a claimed sense 
of favourable social self-worth that a person wants others to have of her or him.” Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 
supra note 274, at 187; Weixia Cher Chen, A critique of “loss of face” arguments in cultural defense 
cases: A comparative study, in MULTICULTURAL JURISPRUDENCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
CULTURAL DEFENSE 247-260 (Marie-Claire Foblets & Alison Dundes Renteln eds., Hart Publishing 
2009) 
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and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal 
agencies in the situation.”282 “A line” in this context refers to patterns 
of “verbal and nonverbal acts by which [a person] expresses his view 
of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, 
especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a 
line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants 
will assume that he has more or less wilfully taken a stand, so that if 
he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration 
the impression they have possibly formed of him.” 283  A person’s 
“face”, in this sense, is clearly not something that is lodged in or on 
their body, “but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow 
of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these 
events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in 
them.”284  
This synergy between “face” and the taking of “a line” can be 
explained by way of the following examples: “A person may be said 
to be in wrong face when information is brought forth in some way 
about his social worth which cannot be integrated, even with effort, 
into the line that is being sustained for him. A person may be said to 
be out of face when he participates in a contact with others without 
having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are 
expected to take. The intent of many pranks is to lead a person into 
showing a wrong face or no face, but there will also be serious 
occasions, of course, when he will find himself expressively out of 
touch with the situation. When a person senses that he is in face, he 
typically responds with feelings of confidence and assurance. Firm in 
the line he is taking, he feels that he can hold his head up and openly 
present himself to others. He feels some security and some relief, as 
he also can when the others feel he is in wrong face but successfully 
hide these feelings from him. When a person is in wrong face or out 
of face, expressive events are being contributed to the encounter which 
cannot be readily woven into the expressive fabric of the occasion. 
Should he sense that he is in wrong face or out of face he is likely to 
feel ashamed and inferior because of what has happened to the activity 
on his account and because of what may happen to his reputation as a 
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participant. Further, he may feel bad because he had relied upon the 
encounter to support an image of self to which he has become 
emotionally attached and which he now finds threatened. Felt lack of 
judgmental support from the encounter may take him aback, confuse 
him, and momentarily incapacitate him as an interactant. His manner 
and bearing may falter, collapse, and crumble. He may become 
embarrassed and chagrined; he may become shamefaced. The feeling, 
whether warranted or not, that he is perceived in a flustered state by 
others, and that he is presenting no usable line, may add further 
injuries to his feelings, just as his change from being in wrong face or 
out of face to being shamefaced can add further disorder to the 
expressive organization of the situation.”285  
Face, is therefore a quantitative concept which means that a person 
can possess a certain amount of face and the amount of face a person 
possess can vary by the acts of that person or those of others. Hsien 
Chin Hu described “face” as consisting of two criteria; (面子, mian-
zi) referring to “a reputation achieved through getting on in life, 
through success and ostentation”, and (脸 , lian) referring to “the 
respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation: the man 
who will fulfill his obligations regardless of the hardships involved, 
who under all circumstances shows himself a decent human being. It 
represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego’s moral 
character, the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function 
properly within the community. Lien is both a social sanction for 
enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction.” 286  One 
therefore lose lian for immoral or socially disagreeable behaviour, and 
this loss is felt acutely, 287  especially when the person holds a 
particularly high social standing in society, as the more dignity he has 
to maintain, the more vulnerable this lian becomes.288 Mian-zi, in 
turn, “can be borrowed, struggled for, added to, padded, - all terms 
indicating a gradual increase in volume. It is built up through initial 
high position, wealth, power, ability, through cleverly establishing 
social ties to a number of prominent people, as well as through 
 
 285 GOFFMAN, supra note 281, at 8-9. 
 286 Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of “Face”, 36 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45, 45 (1944); Oetzel, 
supra note 277, at 236.  
 287 Hu, supra note 286, at 46 and 50. 
 288 Hu, supra note 286, at 47. 
  
2019] LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE ADJUDICATION  249 
avoidance of acts that would cause unfavourable comment.”289 To 
have no lian, therefore casts doubt on the integrity of a person’s moral 
character, while the absence of mian-zi signifies the failure of a person 
to achieve a reputation through success in life.290 These two criteria 
of “face” should not be seen as separate, or entirely independent from 
one another, as lian is bound to overlap with mian-zi. For example, 
lian is included among the conditions determining the amount of a 
person’s mian-zi.291 
Given the general collectivist nature of traditional Chinese culture, 
“face” can be lost in the confrontation with others or the disruption of 
the harmony of a group. It is furthermore not only the face of the 
confronter or disrupter that is lost, but also the face of those who are 
the target of the confrontation or disruption, and it even extends to all 
those who have an interest in the advancements or set-backs of those 
involved, including family members, the wider community of friends 
and superiors and colleagues.292 Oetzel et al explained this as follows: 
“Self-face is the concern for one’s own image, other-face is the 
concern for another’s image, and mutual-face is a concern for both 
parties’ images and/or the “image” of the relationship.”293 When a 
face of a person is threatened, that person will react to it by taking 
counteractions to preserve or restore his or her face. These 
counteractions are generally referred to as “facework”, or “face-
negotiation”, which can be defined as “the communicative strategies 
one uses to enact self-face and to uphold, support, or challenge another 
person’s face”.294 While all people of all cultures “try to maintain and 
negotiate face in all communication situations”, cultural variability 
exists and it is closely linked with collectivist/individualist cultural 
patterns in society. “Face negotiation” in terms of traditional Chinese 
culture is, for example, a primary concern in social interaction and 
contexts, and is generally regarded as deeply imbedded in everyday 
discourse.295 
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It is against this background of the collectivist nature of traditional 
Chinese culture and the cultural concept of “face”, that the operation 
of the respective models of lay participation in the People’s Republic 
of China and its Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong must 
be critically evaluated and understood. In 2016, statistics showed that 
42.7% of criminal trials in the Hong Kong Court of First Instance was 
conducted in Chinese, and by inference had a fully Chinese conversant 
jury empanelled.296 It is not, therefore, unlikely that jury members in 
Hong Kong may exhibit many traditional Chinese cultural views, 
values, and practices, including the cultural concept of “face”, and that 
they may tend to avoid voicing differing opinions, posing questions, 
or even admitting when they do not understand a particular aspect of 
the trial or evidence. For example, in a 1992 survey conducted 
amongst Hong Kong jury members, it was found that almost half of 
all jury members had difficulty in understanding the evidence 
admitted at trial. Other jurors reported difficulty in following the 
proceedings given their inadequate English language proficiency and 
only 24% of these jurors indicated that they would seek clarification 
and help in this regard. The jurors explained their avoiding in seeking 
assistance or voicing their concern as follows: “We did not ask for 
[help]…because the circumstances are very intimidating and there is 
a natural human desire not to look stupid…The whole atmosphere 
prevented anyone raised questions. You’ll make yourself a fool in 
front of everybody. If you speak in Chinese, the question will be 
translated. You’ll feel more stupid…. The procedure of the trial was 
led by professionals. I found myself a stranger at court. Naturally I 
kept silent.”297  
Likewise, in the discussion and analysis of lay participation in the 
People’s Republic of China above, the passivism on the part of 
people’s assessors was also remarked upon from as early as the 1983 
legislative endeavours to the most recent 2019 enactments. In addition 
to lack of training, instructions and more fundamental educational 
concerns, it was also noted - and contrary to the position in Hong Kong 
- that a tight-knitted relationship continued to exist between the 
people’s assessors and the courts within and judges alongside whom 
 
 296 Key Figures and Statistics, H.K. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 31 ,2018), http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/about/ 
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they served, thwarting the valuable oversight function that 
independent and impartial lay participation in legal proceedings is 
supposed to serve. The persistent heavy workload coupled with the 
more generous compensation lay assessors were entitled to pursuant 
to article 18 of the People’s Assessors Decision of 2004 and article 14 
of the Regulation of Selecting, Examining and Appointing Law 
Assessors of 13 December 2004, further perpetuated the risk of them 
becoming so financially dependent on the courts, that they “may bend 
over to satisfy the court, his employer, and become ‘susceptible to’ the 
court’s (and indirectly the state’s) ‘direct influence’”. 298  These 
systematic problems in the system of lay participation in the 
adjudication of legal disputes in the People’s Republic of China 
certainly exacerbate the extent to which the collectivist nature of 
traditional Chinese culture and the cultural concept of “face” may 
impact on the role and value of lay participation in the adjudication of 
legal disputes. 
While it must be granted that most people, from all cultures, will 
find the courtroom setting intimidating and may avoid asking 
questions or attracting attention, it remains unclear, without further 
and more contemporary research on this topic, to what extent 
dominant cultural views and practices may impact on the operation, 
deliberation, and ultimate verdict of lay participants in the 
adjudication of legal disputes. Such research, however, remains an 
impossibility as the deliberations of lay participants in both jury trials 
in Hong Kong, as well as collegial panels in the People’s Republic of 
China are, to a large extent, obscured from public scrutiny and review.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this article, the legal-historical development of trial by peers was 
traced from its origins in medieval law to date. It was shown that the 
medieval modes of proof – trial by ordeal, trial by battle and 
compurgation – were not a proof outcome in the sense of the proof of 
facts, but rather an adjudication outcome in the sense of vindication.299 
Ho explained that “[t]he justice sought through use of the medieval 
modes of proof was not grounded in substantive norms operating on 
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the facts of the case; it was based, rather, on submission to and faith 
in a spiritual power”.300 The legal-historical overview provided in this 
article also showed that these medieval modes of proof or adjudication 
should not easily be dismissed as primitive, irrational, or mystical.301 
Brown explained that the “very course of the ritual of the ordeal helped 
to contain a conflict and to bring about a resolution. The ceremony 
applied a discreet massage to the ruffled feelings of the group. […] 
[A] ceremony such as the ordeal was a theatrical bid for consensus in 
a society still so balanced as to make any other form of human 
agreement on insoluble issues seem to involve all participants in a loss 
of face.”302 
It was from the abolition of these early modes of proof that our 
modern modes for adjudication developed. These modes of 
adjudication no longer look to the spiritual realm for resolution, but 
are rather premised on facts and reasoning.303 Lay participation in 
these adjudication processes has always been present in some way or 
form, in legal systems of both the common law tradition as well as the 
civil law tradition. Lay participation in the adjudication of legal 
disputes is furthermore not only a vessel for representing the society, 
including its norms, customs, practices, and beliefs, but is also as a 
tool for legitimation in state legal machinery. The power and (legal) 
value of such lay participation should not be underestimated. Of its 
ancient origins Colman explained: “Although in the small medieval 
community the administration of law was often indistinguishable from 
the other business of everyday life, the situation had certain merits 
denied us by our more specialised machinery. The socio-judicial 
apparatus built into the social structure may be seriously 
underestimated by those who are unduly impressed with all the 
paraphernalia of modern law courts with their supporting prison and 
police machinery and professional personnel. As more than one 
observer of African tribal justice has noted, ‘undue homage to legality 
is unnecessary’ where firm institutional arrangements protect the 
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weak, provide safeguards against exploitation, and enforce speedy 
restitution and reconciliation in cases of misdemeanour or crime.”304  
The focus of this article was specifically on lay participation in the 
adjudication of criminal trials in the People’s Republic of China and 
its Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. Although an 
analysis of legal regulations, secondary sources, and sporadic media 
reports can never truly provide us with a full view and textured insight 
as to how exactly lay participation in the process of adjudication 
works, such an analysis can nonetheless provide a valuable legal-
historical and comparative overview of how lay participation in the 
adjudication of criminal disputes are effected in different 
jurisdictions.305 The geographical transplants of legal systems and 
their institutions for adjudication, including the participation of peers, 
can be traced and considered in light of obvious geographical, cultural, 
and historical commonalities and shared value systems, as well as 
those diverging.  
With regard to the People’s Republic of China and its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, it was noted that the 
increasingly tenuous border between the PRC and Hong Kong masks 
a deeper, invisible but very real ideological, if not cultural cleft 
between the two jurisdictions. Hong Kong’s qualified attachment to 
English colonial institutions, such as the adapted jury system, and the 
Administrative Region’s staunch insistence on keeping the laws and 
processes of the erstwhile colonial power, serve as more than just 
colonial relics and reminders; this attachment reveals a deeper 
jurisprudential identification and some kind of self-determination 
through the modes of adjudication usually associated with the 
common law tradition. But it is not mere mimicry. From early on the 
trial by jury system in Hong Kong developed its own unique features 
and diverged from its counterpart in the laws of England and Wales. 
Jurisdictional self-confidence and adaptability also played out in the 
People’s Republic of China, where a practice of legal transplantation 
and adaptation to local needs are also prevalent.306 For example, the 
system of people’s assessors adopted in the People’s Republic of 
China and its ensuing legal reform is curiously moving in the direction 
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of an adversarial process; “[t]he judge-driven investigation, 
punctuated by episodic hearings, that is the hallmark of the 
inquisitorial process is at odds with the lay assessor mechanisms, 
which pull toward concentrated hearings, witness examination and 
diminished reliance on dossiers”.307 In a justice system that has been 
described as “deeply troubled by corruption and plagued by 
undereducated judges” and “that cries out for public scrutiny and 
assistance”, the hope on the part of the government of the People’s 
Republic of China is of course that the people’s assessor system will 
ultimately assist in the curbing of corruption, favouritism, and undue 
influence in the Chinese judiciary:308  
“The assessors’ presence may deter overt corruption, place 
pressure on the judges to get their house in order and provide 
some assurance that disinterested individuals are policing the 
system. Lay assessors may also bring sorely needed talents and 
energy into a system where skill and morale may not be 
particularly high. There is no guarantee of success but, as 
compared to the status quo, lay assessor involvement offers a 
real chance for improvement.”309 
However, the question must also be asked whether the added value 
of greater lay participation which can be observed in both the People’s 
Republic of China and its Special Administrative Region of Hong 
Kong can actually be overestimated. This article described various 
cultural and political forces at work in both the PRC and Hong Kong 
and which have relevance for the question at hand. Perhaps all the 
various strands, motives, policies and tendencies can come together 
and can find a synthesis in the idealised but ultimately banal “lay 
person”. The singular voice of reason, justice, and accountability in a 
complex world. A Lady Justice in the flesh. In the second decade of 
the twenty-first century, what does this individual looks like in the 
fast-developing world of the People’s Republic of China and the post-
colonial, sometimes ambivalent world of Hong Kong? Is this idealised 
yet supposedly “ordinary” individual, the peer of the accused, the 
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guardian of a value system, really capable to carry all the institutional, 
historical and cultural baggage of an ancient institution such as the 
jury system? Will our idealised peer, who, in formalised, even 
intimidating settings such as criminal trials, perhaps rather opt for face 
saving than to be an interrogator of fact and circumstance; will this 
person really be a legitimator of a system in flux? One can, for 
instance, point out the rather arbitrary characterisation of the idealised 
lay person in the People’s Republic of China as being at least 28 years 
of age. Why 28? A quirk of the administrative state, perhaps, or 
indicative of a perception of what minimum life experience the 
idealised lay person can be expected to have.? It may be the case that 
a more experienced, more mature individual makes for a better lay 
participant in the judicial process. But compare this to the experience 
in Hong Kong, where one can note something else as well: despite 
generations’ worth of colonial experience, a remarkable percentage of 
jurors in the Special Administrative Region exhibit the kind of cultural 
reactions to unusual or difficult situations (such as adjudicating in 
complex criminal cases) with the deep seated concept of “face”. On 
the assumption that this cultural feature is still pervasive in both 
jurisdictions, it brings us to the question of whether any significant 
lack of probing, questioning and other deviations from “face saving” 
may undermine a conception of lay participation which many in the 
West may have because of an emphasis on individualistic and critical 
lay engagement with evidentiary matters. Even if the conclusion is that 
deep seated cultural practices and values make for an unusual lay 
participation experience (at least from a Western perspective), the 
institutions of lay participation in the People’s Republic of China and 
its Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong must ultimately be 
evaluated on their own terms.  
Whether lay participation in the legal proceedings of the People’s 
Republic of China and its Special Administrative Region of Hong 
Kong truly contribute to the credibility and independence of the 
respective legal adjudication processes, remains questionable. In the 
People’s Republic of China, under the People’s Assessors Decision of 
2004 and before the most recent legislative scheme was enacted, little 
empirical evidence existed to support that these ideals have been 
achieved. 310  Xin He described the Chinese people’s assessors as 
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“little more than lackeys” who only contribute to the positive 
impression of Chinese courts to the Chinese public and outside 
world.311 And in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong 
with its jury trials at the Court of First Instance, the true value and 
impact of lay participation in the bureaucratic legal machinery remain 
a mystery, shielded by the sacrosanct nature of the jury system itself. 
Ultimately, it should be clear that - like in medieval times in Europe 
- lay participation in the adjudication of legal proceedings today, 
whether in the West, in the People’s Republic of China, or in Hong 
Kong, continue to serve as an important ritual; “a discreet massage to 
the ruffled feelings of the group… [and] a theatrical bid for consensus 
in a society still so balanced as to make any other form of human 
agreement on insoluble issues seem to involve all participants in a loss 
of face.” 312  
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